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The Supreme Court and Patents: 
Moving Toward a Postmodern Vision of 
“Progress”? 
Simone A. Rose 
 This paper challenges the traditional “modernist” view that 
incentive-centered patent protection is essential to meet the 
constitutional mandate of providing exclusive rights for limited 
times to inventors in order to “promote progress of the useful 
Arts.”  For a modernist society, industrial/economic growth is one 
of the key dimensions for measuring forward-moving progress.  As 
modernists, we advocate that a robust exclusive rights scheme for 
inventors is necessary to incentivize research and development, 
which in turn stimulates economic growth and promotes progress.  
This is currently the “grand narrative” of patent law.  Applying 
this narrative, Congress, the Patent and Trademark Office 
(“PTO”), and the courts have elevated the goal of incentivizing 
research as synonymous with promoting progress.  As a result, 
what constitutes Section 101 patent-eligible subject matter has 
expanded over time to include “anything under the sun made by 
man.”  The novelty, non-obvious and enablement/written 
description requirements are deemed adequate proxies for 
determining what is patentable and what remains in the public 
domain, without the need for specifically evaluating subject matter 
eligibility. 
What we often neglect to explore in patent law, however, are 
the societal perils and risks wrought by the modernist incentive-
 
   Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law.   I would like to thank 
Christine Nero Coughlin, Samuel Oddi, Ron Wright and Atolani Akinkuotu for their 
invaluable assistance and support in the preparation of this article.  A special 
thanks to Margaret Chon for inspiring me to pursue this topic. 
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centered paradigm.  The flaw in the modernist patent narrative is 
that by focusing the measure of societal progress on technological 
advancement and economic growth, we fail to adequately balance 
other equally important measures of progress such as improving 
public health, sustainability and access to basic research tools.  A 
radicalized modern view of patent law allows us to challenge the 
incentive-centered narrative of promoting progress and consider 
this narrative’s impact on future discoveries, humanism, morality 
and the environment.  The Supreme Court recently took a step in 
this direction by restoring a balanced view of subject-matter 
eligibility and questioning whether Congress needs to explore 
other paradigms for protecting certain patent-ineligible subject 
matter. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
[T]he patent system represents a carefully crafted 
bargain that encourages both the creation and public 
disclosure of new and useful advances in 
technology, in return for an exclusive monopoly for 
a limited time.1 
 
In recent attempts to strike the balance, Congress 
has tended to focus on the motivation to innovate 
[incentive] side of the balance and paid less 
attention to the impediment to innovation side, 
perhaps because innovators include well-funded 
lobbyists.2 
 
In drafting the U.S. Constitution, the Founding Fathers took the 
time to consider what role the federal government should have in 
protecting writings and inventions created in the United States.3  
Although many Framers had concerns about the anticompetitive 
effect of monopolies,4 in the end, they were persuaded by the 
Madisonian view that federal intellectual property protection was 
needed to promote both economic and overall societal “progress.”5  
The final version of the Constitution’s Intellectual Property (“IP”) 
Clause acknowledged this tension between providing exclusive 
rights and promoting free market competition by instructing 
 
 1 Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998). 
 2 Max Stul Oppenheimer, The Time and Place for “Technology-Shifting” Rights, 14 
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 269, 305 (2012). 
 3 See Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of 
Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L. J. 1771, 
1804–05 (2006). 
 4 See id. (citing debates between Thomas Jefferson and James Madison  about 
monopolies and noting Jefferson as being a little more anti-monopolistic and  arguing 
that the IP Clause “struck middle ground between their positions”). 
 5 See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 5–9 (1966) (discussing the 
Patent Right as being based on the Constitutional mandate to “promote the progress of 
the useful arts” and noting that Congress should not attempt to enlarge this monopoly 
considering the “innovation, advancement or social benefits gained”). 
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Congress to provide these exclusive rights for “limited times” to 
authors and inventors for the specific purpose of promoting “the 
progress of Science [Copyright] and useful Arts [Patents].”6 
Scholars continue to debate the range of legislative power 
provided by the IP clause and whether the “to promote progress” 
portion of the clause limits Congress to providing an exclusive 
rights framework that will in fact promote progress.7  The 
dominant view is that the progress portion of the IP clause is 
merely an introductory preamble that fails to limit Congress’s 
intellectual property power.8  Interestingly, the source of this view, 
Nimmer on Copyright, fails to cite any legal or textual argument 
supporting this position.9  Scholars and some courts counter the 
Nimmer view with the more persuasive argument that the only way 
to give true meaning and textual balance to the IP clause is to view 
 
 6 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (“To promote the Progress of Science [Copyright] 
and useful Arts [Patents], by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”). 
 7 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 5 (explaining that the “promote progress” clause is both a 
grant of power and a limitation); see also Chon, infra note 16, at 98–99 (discussing the 
possible interpretations of the mandate for Congress’s patent power to promote progress 
and noting that some scholars view progress “as best promoted through market 
competition, while others have found in the patent and copyright clause a mandate for 
innovation”). 
 8 See Oliar, supra note 3, at 1781 (noting that the dominant reading of the IP clause 
interprets the Progress Clause as a “preamble of no operative effect” rather than a 
limitation); see also MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 
1.03 (2004) (“This introductory phrase is in the main explanatory of the purpose of 
copyright, without in itself constituting a rigid standard against which any copyright act 
must be measured.”); 1 NIMMER at § 1.03[B] (“[T]he introductory phrase, rather than 
constituting a limitation on Congressional authority, has for the most part tended to 
expand such authority.”). 
 9   Although there are many variations in interpretation, the two dominant views are 
that the Progress portion of the IP clause is simply a non-binding preamble introducing 
Congress’s broad powers in implementing Patent and Copyright protection.  Professors 
Melville and David Nimmer have been cited as advancing this view without supporting 
citations, yet this view has been followed by various courts. See Oliar, supra note 3, at 
1781–82 (discussing four varying interpretations of the IP clause’s Progress and 
Exclusive Rights provisions and noting that courts, the U.S. government as well as other 
commentators follow the Nimmer view.); see also Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual 
Property Clause’s External Limitations, 61 DUKE L.J. 1329, 1339 (2012) (discussing the 
text and structure of the IP Clause and crediting the Nimmers for advancing the 
proposition that the Progress portion of the IP clause is “nothing more than a non-binding 
preamble.”).  
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the progress portion of the clause as an express limit requiring 
Congress to ensure that any patent or copyright statute does in fact 
promote progress.10  Unlike Nimmer, these scholars provide solid 
historical evidence, structural analysis, legal precedent and policy 
arguments to support their position.11 
Once one accepts the promotion of progress as a limitation on 
Congress’s intellectual property power, one must define 
“progress.”By the time the United States won its independence, 
European culture was steeped in modernism, which extols the 
virtues of capitalism, industrial growth, global expansion and the 
development of military power.12  Since the United States was the 
progeny of England, it is no surprise that we would adopt the 
“modernist” view of progress as developing a strong capitalist 
framework, sustained industrial and economic growth13 as well as 
 
 10 See id. at 1336, 1340–43. 
 11 According to Fromer and Oliar, the other, more persuasive view from an historical, 
structural and policy position is that “the progress provision is an independent 
restriction.” Fromer, supra note 9, at 1336.  Oliar in his article takes the time to piece 
together the Framer’s limited discussions on monopolies and the proposed structure of 
the IP clause to substantiate the Progress as a limitation view.  Both Oliar and Fromer 
evaluate the structural composition of the IP Clause and persuasively argue that the non-
binding precedent view is incorrect since it fails to give meaning to the first 
“empowerment” portion of the clause and goes against the natural textual reading or an 
ends-means relationship between providing exclusive rights (the means) to promote the 
end result of promoting progress. See Fromer, supra note 9, at 1339–1340; Oliar, supra 
note 3, at 1810–18.  The Oliar and Fromer views are consistent with leading Supreme 
Court cases. See, e.g., Graham, 383 U.S. at 6 (noting that Congress should not attempt to 
enlarge the patent monopoly without considering the “innovation, advancement or social 
benefit gained thereby. . . . Innovation, advancement and things which add to the sum of 
useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system, which by constitutional 
command must ‘promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts.’  This is the standard expressed 
in the Constitution and it may not be ignored.”); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 
186, 242–267, (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite 
Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126–27 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (adopting the view that  
the progress provision serves as a limitation because “too much patent protection can 
impede rather than ‘promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts’”).  
For an additional argument that Congress’s power to promote progress of science and the 
useful arts is not limited to patent and copyrights, see Edward C. Walterscheid, To 
Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The Anatomy of a Congressional 
Power, 43 IDEA 1, 7–8 (2002). 
 12 Id. at 55–62. 
 13 Id. at 58–60. 
C02_ROSE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/2013  3:42 PM 
1202 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 23:1197 
military power.14  According to leading sociologist Anthony 
Giddens, a modernist society includes both capitalism and 
industrialism as two of its four basic dimensions.15  In its infancy, 
the United States was primarily an agrarian economy, with no true 
industrial base.16  Most of its creative expression and useful 
inventions came from Europe, or the Far East.17  A mechanism for 
promoting the creation of domestic intellectual property would 
prevent the United States from remaining perpetually dependent on 
the outside world.  Thus, it is not difficult to hypothesize that the 
Framers’ view of promoting progress envisioned the modernist 
paradigm of providing intellectual property rights that would 
incentivize artistic endeavors as well as research and development 
of the useful arts.18  This, in turn, would stimulate knowledge and 
 
 14 See AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1093 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 3d ed. 
1993) (defining “progress” as “development or growth” or “steady improvement, as of a 
society or civilization”); see also ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
MODERNITY 55–62 (1990) (discussing the dimension of modernity); ROUTLEDGE 
COMPANION TO POSTMODERNISM viii–x (Stuart Sim ed., 3rd ed. 2011) (discussing what 
constitutes “modernism”). 
 15 GIDDENS, supra note 14, at 59 (outlining the four dimensions that control the 
dynamics of a modern society:  1)  Capitalism (capital accumulation in the context of 
competitive labor and product markets); 2) Industrialism (transformation of nature: 
development of the “created or industrialized” environment); 3) Surveillance (control of 
information and social supervision); and 4) Military Power (control of the means of 
violence in the context of the industrialization of war)). 
 16 See Economic Growth and the Early Industrial Revolution, INDEPENDENCE HALL 
ASS’N, http://www.ushistory.org/us/22a.asp (last visited Feb. 2, 2013). 
 17 See id. 
 18 In 1949, Karl Lutz began this discussion in his seminal article. Karl Lutz, Patents 
and Science A Clarification of the U.S. Constitution, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50 (1949).  
In this piece, Lutz evaluates the legislative history and plain language to conclude that 
when discussing the IP Clause’s mandate, the United States Patent System “should omit 
any reference to ‘science,’” since this refers to copyright and global knowledge, and 
should use phrases similar to:  “[t]o promote the useful arts,” “[t]o promote the progress 
of technology,” and “[t]o accelerate technological progress.” Lutz, at 54.  Later scholars 
further dissected what the framers meant by progress and introduced historical evidence 
such as the pre-constitutional debates between Jefferson and Madison, the scant 
legislative history and textual “plain meaning” analysis to substantiate the “promote 
progress” clause specifically limits Congress’s intellectual property power and includes 
the vision of increasing our knowledge base and improving the economy. See, e.g., Malla 
Pollack, What is Congress Supposed to Promote?: Defining “Progress” in Article 1, 
Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, or Introducing the Progress Clause, 
80 NEB. L. REV. 754 (2001); Oliar, supra note 3, at 1781–82; Fromer, supra note 9, at 
1339. 
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economic growth in the United States, thereby lessening our 
cultural and economic dependency on Europe.19  Arguably, the 
incentive-based view of patents and copyrights as engines for 
stimulating economic progress did in fact contribute to the 
modernist goal of industrial growth and improved socioeconomic 
status.  By the twentieth century, the United States was a leader in 
technological development and one of the world’s military and 
economic superpowers.20 
Historically, the Supreme Court provided minimal guidance on 
the progress limitation of the IP clause as applied to the Patent Act.  
While many courts recited the IP clause as the foundation for 
Congress’s intellectual property power when evaluating 
patentability issues,21 few took the time to discuss how patent law 
 
 19 Margaret Chon, Postmodern “Progress”: Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent 
Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97, 119–20 (1993) (discussing how Eighteenth-Century 
Americans were aware and bothered by their socioeconomic and cultural dependence on 
Europe.  Since the U.S. was a “net importer of ideas and technology,” the concept 
promoting progress in the useful Arts and Science (knowledge) would elevate the United 
States from a lesser-developed country to one of “improved global socioeconomic 
status.” Because many Framers feared the anti-competitive effects of monopolies, the IP 
clause also provided that these exclusive rights be provided for “limited times,” thereby 
ensuring the ultimate enrichment of the public domain); see also Fromer, supra note 9, at 
1373 (‘“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts’ generally refers to the goal 
of encouraging the advancement of systematic knowledge, cultural knowledge, and 
technology.”). 
Other scholars suggest that rather than having an Enlightenment theory of progress as a 
global proxy for “all is getting better,” the Framers as Federalists would view “Progress” 
as “a qualitative improvement of arts and science” by the spreading or dissemination of 
an increased number of writings or the useful arts.  Under this theory, Congress can only 
grant limited exclusive rights to individuals when “those rights promote the spread of 
science and the useful arts.” See Pollack, supra note 18, at 773–79.  Like Chon, Pollack 
ultimately advocates a post-modern, ever-evolving definition of progress when making 
this evaluation. See Pollack, supra note 18, at 778–79. 
 20 See U.S. Status as World’s Superpower Challenged by Rise of China (U.S. 
Favorability Ratings Remain Positive), PEW RESEARCH CENTER PUBLICATIONS (July 13, 
2011), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/2059/-superpower-china (arguing that while the U.S. 
remains the dominant global superpower, Western European leaders acknowledge China 
as rivaling the U.S. for global economic supremacy). 
 21 See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) (stating that 
the Constitution grants the power to Congress to legislate in the area of intellectual 
property); Luck’s Music Library, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 321 F. Supp. 2d 107, 112 (D.D.C. 
2004) (noting that the IP clause grants Congress the power to provide exclusive rights to 
inventors and authors); U.S. v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1137 (N.D. Cal. 2002) 
(stating that “[u]nder the Intellectual Property Clause, Congress is empowered ‘to 
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specifically promotes progress.  Instead, courts appear to accept 
that as long as the basic statutory requirements for patentability are 
met, providing the patent right per se promotes progress.22  Thus, 
Congress never reflects on how any proposed amendments to the 
Patent Act meet the constitutional mandate to promote progress,23 
and Graham v. John Deere remains one of the few patent cases in 
which the Supreme Court acknowledged that the progress clause of 
the constitution is a limitation that must be considered when 
evaluating patentability.24  Despite the Graham mandate, some 
courts go so far as to hold that the “progress” portion of the IP 
clause is nothing more than an introductory preamble to the 
mandate of providing “exclusive rights for limited times.”25 
 
promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.’”); In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (explaining that 
Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution is the provision that authorized Congress to create 
a patent system). 
 22 See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980) (explaining that 
Congress intended the  statutory requirements of the Patent Act to be given wide scope so 
as to fulfill the constitutional and statutory goal of promoting  progress); see also In re 
Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 980 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Chakrabarty). 
 23 But see 157 CONG. REC. S5410 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Rep. Hatch) 
(explaining that the bill, although not perfect, strikes a balance between providing 
inventors with exclusive rights to profit from their inventions and allowing information to 
be available for public knowledge and implying that this balance complies with 
constitutional mandate); see also 157 Cong. Rec. H4505 (daily ed. June 23, 2011) 
(discussing adding a grace period to the American Invents Act); Letter from the House 
Comm. on the Judiciary, America Invents Act (H.R. 1249) (explaining the America 
Invents Act will positively affect the interests of both innovators and the population as a 
whole) (May 23, 2011), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/issues/Dear%20 
Colleague%2005232011.html.   
 24 Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966) (stating that the clause 
is both a grant of power and a limitation).  
 25 In sharp contrast, the Copyright Act contains numerous limitations, such as Fair 
Use, that reflect a careful balancing of incentivizing creativity against access and many 
copyright cases discuss of the significance of being mindful of promoting progress and 
preserving this balance when interpreting the Act. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (2006); see also 
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that “the Copyright 
Act was intended to promote creativity, thereby benefitting the artist and the public alike.  
To preserve the potential future use of artistic works for purposes of teaching, research, 
criticism, and news reporting, Congress created the fair use exception.”); Stewart v. 
Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228–29, (1990) (noting that “although dissemination of creative 
works is a goal of the Copyright Act, the Act creates a balance between the artist’s right 
to control the work during the term of the copyright protection and the public’s need for 
C02_ROSE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/2013  3:42 PM 
2013] A POSTMODERN VISION OF “PROGRESS”? 1205 
 Rather than engage in a constitutional discourse, courts were 
more likely to espouse the “grand incentive narrative” as a 
justification for broadening the patent right, noting that patents are 
essential to incentivizing research and development and that 
without them we would impede economic growth.26  The goal of 
incentivizing research and development, then, is elevated to near 
synonymy with promoting progress of the useful Arts.  As a result, 
courts and the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) 
continue to broaden their understanding of what constitutes patent-
eligible subject matter under Section 101 to include “anything 
under the sun made by man” as long as it is useful, novel, non-
obvious and meets the written description and enablement 
requirements.27  This paradigm requires elevating Sections 102, 
 
access to creative works.”); Eng’g Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 
1335, 1344–5 (5th Cir. 1994) (explaining that the limitations on copyright protection 
follow logically from the purpose of the Copyright Act: “to protect an author’s original, 
creative expression insofar as is compatible with general advancement of expressive arts 
and ‘the free use and development of non-protectable ideas and processes.’”). See 
generally Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 26 See, e.g., Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 480–81 (“The patent laws promote this progress 
[from the IP clause mandate] by offering a right of exclusion for a limited period as an 
incentive to inventors to risk the often enormous costs in terms of time, research, and 
development.  The productive effort thereby fostered will have a positive effect on 
society through the introduction of new products and processes of manufacture into the 
economy, and the emanations by way of increased employment and better lives for our 
citizens.”); see also Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 315 (“The subject-matter provisions of the 
patent law have been cast in broad terms to fulfill the constitutional and statutory goal of 
promoting the ‘Progress of Science and the useful Arts’ with all that means for the social 
and economic benefits envisioned by Jefferson.”); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. 
USPTO, 653 F.3d 1329, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Moore, J., concurring) (arguing that 
patent protection for genomic material, including isolated genes is crucial for continued 
innovation and economic growth of the biotechnology industry). 
 For a scholarly commentary lamenting the current imbalance that results from the 
incentive-based grand narrative, see Oppenheimer, supra note 2, at 269, 305 (“[Under the 
mandate of the IP Clause] there is room to reward innovators with exclusive rights while 
still reserving to the public sufficient rights to guard against stifling further innovation.  
In recent attempts to strike the balance, Congress has tended to focus on the motivation to 
innovate [incentive] side of the balance and paid less attention to the impediment to 
innovation side, perhaps because innovators include well-funded lobbyists.”). 
 27 See, e.g., In re Allapat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1994), abrogated by In re 
Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (erroneously citing the Supreme Court’s Diamond 
v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) for the proposition that the Supreme Court has 
acknowledged that Congress intended Section 101 to include “anything under the sun that 
is made by man.”).  Like many courts citing the Chakrabarty case for this proposition, 
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103 and 112 to proxies for vetting eligible subject matter under 
Section 101.28  Recently, the Federal Circuit did just that, in CLS 
Bank International. v Alice Corporation Party, Inc.29  There, rather 
than making Section 101 subject-matter eligibility the threshold 
test for patentability, the court reduced Section 101 to “a general 
statement of the type of subject matter that is eligible for patent 
protection [with] . . . .[s]pecific conditions for patentability to 
follow” in Sections 102, 103 and 112.30  According to many courts, 
by broadly evaluating what constitutes patentable subject matter, 
we ensure “progress of the useful Arts,” which, as we have seen, is 
frequently equated with industrial growth.31  Implicit in this grand 
narrative is that, by creating a broad incentive to invent patentable 
subject matter, both the economy and society will flourish.  This is 
the epitome of modernism, which, in its focus on economic 
advancement, is frequently devoid of considerations of human or 
 
the Federal Circuit neglects the next part of the opinion which qualifies that “the anything 
under the sun” language found in the patent legislative history is subject to the common 
law exclusions of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas. See Chakrabarty, 447 
U.S. at 309. 
 28 Since 1984 the PTO rules have allowed the patentability of genetic material, 
including isolated genes, without citing textual support for this interpretation.  The 
Federal Circuit later argued that, to not view isolated genes as patentable subject matter 
would hurt the biotechnology industry’s twenty-five-year reliance on this unsupported 
rule. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1358 (Moore, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part).  Even after the Supreme Court reigns in the Federal Circuit and 
reminds them of the significance of Section 101, they are still diminishing the role of 
Section 101 to serve as “the threshold test for patentability” and that District Courts can 
use 102, 103 and 112 as proxies. See generally Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) 
(explaining that Congress intended statutory subject matter to include anything under the 
sun that is made by man, thus, a claim for a physical and chemical process for molding 
precision synthetic rubber product falls within the categories of patentable subject 
matter); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 976 (Fed. Cir. 2008) aff’d but criticized sub nom. 
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (U.S. 2010); In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1358 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007); Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1064 
(Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 837 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
 29 685 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2012).  
 30 Id. at 1348 (holding that “[Section 101] need not always be addressed first, 
particularly when other sections might be discerned by the trial judge as having the 
promise to resolve a dispute more expeditiously or with more clarity and predictability”). 
 31 See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 315 (“The subject-matter provisions of the patent law 
have been cast in broad terms to fulfill the constitutional and statutory goal of promoting 
‘the Progress of Science and the useful Arts’ with all that means for the social and 
economic benefits envisioned by Jefferson.”); see also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 
689 F.3d at 1358 (Moore, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).   
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environmental impact.32  Such a view of promoting progress is 
focused on forward movement and will not consider moving 
backwards or sideways to prevent greater societal harm.33 
The flaw in the modernist patent narrative is that by focusing 
the measure of societal progress on technological advancement and 
economic growth, we fail to adequately balance other equally 
important measures of progress such as improving public health, 
sustainability, and access to basic research tools.  This Article 
advocates adopting a radicalized modernist view of patent law that 
challenges the incentive-centered narrative of promoting progress 
and critically assesses this narrative’s impact on future discoveries, 
humanity, and the environment. 
This Article is framed by the sociological constructs of 
modernism, radicalized modernism, and post-modernism.34  
Sociology, the study of human behavior, is useful to our purposes 
because it supplies valuable information about how we relate to 
each other, which can be used to help us understand how we 
structure various social institutions, including the law.35  
Modernism, the current societal paradigm, focusing on capitalism, 
industrialism and military power, helps us understand where we 
are.36  Radicalized modernism, where society attempts to 
deconstruct the perils of modernism, forces us to question the 
status quo.37  In sharp contrast, post-modernism is the utopian goal 
of a more holistic societal construct, which accounts for the perils 
of modernism and motivates us to effectuate any necessary 
changes or interpretations of the law.38 
 
 32 See, e.g., Estelle Derclaye, Eudemonic Intellectual Property: Patents and Related 
Rights As Engines of Happiness, Peace, and Sustainability, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 
495, 525 (2012).  
 33 See Chon, supra note 19, at 114–34 (arguing that the traditional modernist view of 
the IP clause’s Progress mandate should be abandoned and replaced with a post-modern 
or enhanced view of progress). 
 34 I chose this construct after using Professor Margaret Chon’s seminal piece, 
Postmodern “Progress”: Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent Power, 43 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 97 (1993) as part of my Advanced Copyright Seminar.  
 35 See id. at 10–15. 
 36 See id. at 48–49. 
 37 See id. at 150. 
 38 See id. at 54–55. 
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The first part of this Article explores sociologist Anthony 
Giddens’ argument that, contrary to many assertions, the United 
States is still operating under the basic four dimensions of 
modernism: Capitalism, Surveillance/Control, Military Power and 
Industrialism.  According to Giddens, we have yet to evolve into a 
“post-modern” order of multilayered democratic participation, a 
post-scarcity system, demilitarization and a humanization of 
technology.39  Instead, we are currently in a state of “radicalized 
modernism” where we are beginning to question the modernist 
narratives in light of views of the past and future.40  The ultimate 
goal of the radicalized modernist is to determine what aspects of 
our sociological framework are “true” and what should be 
modified or eliminated in moving toward the post-modern 
paradigm.41  The Article then applies Giddens’ sociological 
construct to how courts and the PTO currently evaluate the 
patentability of biotechnology and genomic subject matter.  I will 
establish that the current application of the incentive-centered 
patent narrative found in many biotechnology and genomic 
subject-matter eligibility cases fits squarely within the capitalist 
and industrial growth dimensions of modernism and fails to 
respond adequately to the sociological risks and perils as outlined 
by Giddens. 
The second part of the Article applies the modernist theories of 
Giddens and, in the IP context, the postmodernist theories of 
Professor Margaret Chon to argue that a postmodern view of 
progress is more balanced and constitutionally sound than our 
current incentive-based modernist view and should be our ultimate 
goal.  Finally, I contribute to this discussion by arguing that to 
fully evolve to a post-modernist view of progress, we must take the 
bold next step of evaluating the Patent Act from a radicalized 
modernist perspective to determine the impact of providing these 
 
 39 See id. at 164–65. 
 40 Id. at 149–150.  
 41 See, e.g., Constance Lever-Tracy, Global Warming and Sociology, 56 CURRENT 
SOC. 445, 453–55 (2008) (citing Giddens’ explanation of radicalized modernity and 
Giddens’ discussion of global warming as a product of human intervention, and 
discussing the radical modernist approach to global warming and how this approach 
involves “asking the kinds of questions about future directions that most sociologists 
believe they have now put behind them.”).   
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incentive-centered exclusive rights on future discoveries, 
humanism, morality and the environment.  I posit that the Supreme 
Court took a first step in Mayo Collaborative Services v. 
Prometheus by challenging the incentive-centered patent narrative 
and reinforcing the significance of Section 101’s subject matter 
eligibility requirement as the threshold test for patentability.42  
There, the Court began to embrace the vision of the “Progress 
Project” by acknowledging access to basic building block research 
as a fundamental right which sometimes supersedes the 
presumptive power of patents to incentivize research.43  The Mayo 
court also took a subtler, yet equally powerful, step from a 
radicalized modernist perspective—leaving the door open for 
Congress to determine whether certain patent-ineligible subject 
matter should still be protected under a more limited sui generis IP 
framework.44 
 
 42 See generally Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 
(2012). 
 43 Id. at 1303 (“And so cases have endorsed a bright-line prohibition against patenting 
laws of nature, mathematical formulas and the like, which serves as a somewhat more 
easily administered proxy for the underlying ‘building-block’ concern.”). 
 44 See generally id. 
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I. COURTS MISTAKENLY VIEW “PROGRESS” THROUGH A 
MODERNIST LENS45 
A. Modernity: A Background 
The one constant in attempts to define modernity or what 
constitutes a “modern social order” is that there is no constant.46  
Sociologists disagree on what serves as the foundation for 
“modernist” thought.47  The Marx-centered view places capitalism 
at the center of modern society and holds that class struggle is its 
fundamental weakness.48  Others, like Durkheim, focus on 
industrialism and the division of labor as the overarching dynamic 
in a modern society.49  Still others, such as Weber, start with a 
capitalist set of ideas and values yet frame modernity in a 
discussion of “rationalization,” surveillance and expansion of 
consolidated power or the “nation-state.” 50 
Anthony Giddens provides one of the more comprehensive 
definitions of modernity.  According to Giddens, “‘modernity’ 
refers to modes of social life or organization which emerged in 
Europe from about the seventeenth century onwards and which 
 
 45 One might question why place discussion of “constitutional progress” in the 
sociological context of modernism, radicalized modernism and post-modernism?  
Theoretically, the value of sociology is it that it supplies valuable information about us 
and how we relate to each other, which we can then use to gain control over how we 
structure various social institutions, including the law.  This “control” parallels the 
control that the “physical sciences provide in the realm of nature.” GIDDENS, supra note 
14, at 15.  This led to researching numerous sociological discussions on modernism and 
post-modernism, some broad, some context-specific.  Ultimately, I was struck by the 
following statement of Professor Anthony Giddens which takes this paradigm one step 
further: “Sociological knowledge spirals in and out of the universe of social life, 
reconstructing both itself and that universe as an integral part of that process.” Id. at 15–
16.  Thus, I posit that scholars should encourage Congress to reflect on the various social 
dynamics that frame the construct of our society and then in particular, the law.  
Modernism, the societal construct centered around capitalism, industrialism and military 
power, helps us understand where we are as a society.  Radicalized modernism helps us 
question and challenge the status quo, while post modernism motivates us to effectuate 
the necessary changes. 
 46 See id. at 39. 
 47 See id. at 7 (discussing how classical founders of sociology differed in their views of 
the modernity).  
 48 Id.  
 49 Id. 
 50 Id.  
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subsequently became more or less worldwide in their influence.”51  
In his book, The Consequences of Modernity,52 Giddens 
synthesizes the various sociological views of modernity and 
proposes that modernity is “multidimensional on the level of 
institutions, and each of the elements specified by these various 
traditions [continues to] play some part [on modern society].”53  
Giddens describes the four interrelated organizational clusters or 
dimensions of modernity as: 1) capitalism (capital accumulation in 
the context of competitive labor and product markets); 2) 
industrialism (transformation of nature: we start developing and 
using technology to “improve” our surrounding environment); 3) 
military power (control of the means of violence in the context of 
the industrialization of war); and 4) surveillance (control of 
information and social supervision-the basis for the creation of 
nation-states, rather than tribal communities).54  Within each 
dimension, Giddens encourages us to consider how modernity 
continues to impact the following dynamics: 1) the separation of 
time and space (abandoning the pre-modern localized society for 
the global society that no longer requires physical presence to 
develop relationships); 2) the development of disembedding 
mechanisms (the creation of symbolic tokens, such as money 
economies the abandonment of our spiritual base; our increased 
 
 51 Id. at 1.  According to Giddens, “[m]odern organizations are able to connect the 
local and the global in ways which would have been unthinkable in more traditional [pre-
modern] societies and in so doing routinely affect the lives of millions.” Id. at 20. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at 12.  Giddens discusses the three dominant sources of the dynamism of 
modernity: 1) the separation of time and space (getting away from localized activity and 
developing global connections); 2) the development of disembedding mechanisms (the 
creation of symbolic tokens such as money economies and the integration of “expert 
systems” into our ordinary life, with an abiding trust in science and technological 
development; and 3) a reflexive appropriation of knowledge. Id. at 53. 
 54 Id. at 57–59.  Giddens also posits that each dimension of modernity includes its own 
variation of the dynamics of modernism, namely, the separation of time and space, 
disembedding mechanisms and reflexivity of knowledge. Id. at 63.  Globalization is also 
inherent in the breaking of time and space according to Giddins and he also represents the 
four modern dimensions of globalization as: 1) the world capitalist economy; 2) the 
nation-state system; 3) the world military order; and 4) the international division of labor. 
Id. at 65–78. 
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reliance on experts, science and technology as keys to growth); and 
3) a reflexive appropriation of knowledge.55 
While this ever-evolving and elastic dynamism had a positive 
societal effect within each modernist dimension—we are now both 
an economic and military global “superpower”—it came at a 
price.56  Surveillance and control developed at the expense of 
privacy and trust.  Industrial growth came at the expense of a 
permanent class system.57  Global communication and enhanced 
time and space required some sacrifice of local community and 
global trust.58  Last, but not least, industrial and technological 
growth force us to live with the continued risks of nuclear 
holocaust, unequal access to basic technology, disruption of the 
ecosystem and potential environmental harm.59 
According to Giddens, there are two sets of adaptive responses 
to the perils and risks created by modernism.  The first set we can 
view as conservative responses and the second set we can view as 
pessimistic and radical.  Included in the conservative set, 
pragmatic acceptance reflects a willingness to go along with the 
status quo.60  It is satisfied with temporary gains because pragmatic 
acceptance centers around the belief that society is powerless to 
effectuate true change.61  Sustained optimism, or “persistence of 
 
 55 See id. at 16–17.  Regarding reflexive knowledge, “[w]e are abroad in a world which 
is thoroughly constituted through reflexively applied knowledge, but where at the same 
time we can never be sure that any given element of that knowledge will not be revised.” 
Id. at 39. 
 56 See, e.g., id. at 7 (“Modernity, as everyone living in the closing years of the 
twentieth century can see, is a double-edged phenomenon.”). 
 57 See id. at 55 (noting that capitalism, one of the two distinct “organizational clusters” 
of modernity forms “the main axis of a class system”). 
 58 See id. at 80 (contrasting pre-modern cultures, “where the local community always 
remains the basis of wider social organization” and modern societies where “we interact 
more or less continuously with others whom we either do not know well or have never 
met before-but this interaction takes the form of relatively fleeting contacts”). 
 59 Id. at 124–134; see also BARRY SMART, Postmodernity, in KEY IDEAS 12 (Peter 
Hamilton ed., 1993) (citing Giddens for advocating the humanization of technology as 
key evidence of a much-needed paradigm shift from modernism to post-modernism). 
 60 See GIDDENS, supra note 14, at 135.  
 61 Id..  Giddens posits that pragmatic acceptance leaves society with perpetual anxiety, 
blocking out of reality and perpetual nightmares of an apocalyptic future.  “Pragmatic 
acceptance is compatible with an underlying feeling-tone of pessimism or with the 
nourishment of hope—which may coexist with it ambivalently.” Id. 
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the attitude of enlightenment” is the second conservative adaptive 
response.62  Sustained optimism reflects continued faith in 
modernism and the ability of rationalization and providential 
reasoning of the enlightened to minimize risks and maintain a state 
of forward-moving progress.63 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, the pessimistic and radical 
adaptive responses or attitudes include cynical pessimism and 
radical engagement.64  Giddens describes cynical pessimism as a 
“nostalgia for ways of life that are disappearing or a negative 
attitude toward what is to come.”65  The problem with cynical 
pessimism is that while it acknowledges problems with the status 
quo, it uses cynicism and dark humor as a mode of survival 
without any “formula for action.”66  On the other hand, radical 
engagement takes the proactive position of facing our major 
problems and encouraging society to “either reduce their impact or 
to transcend them.”67 
Giddens posits that as a society, we are now in a state of 
radicalized modernism (“RM”), where we have adapted an attitude 
of radical engagement and are now becoming involved and asking 
the hard questions about how to transform beyond “the institutions 
of modernity.”68  Radicalized modernism acknowledges that we 
are caught up in dialectic of powerlessness and empowerment.69  
Yet, as a society, we continue to struggle with how we can learn 
from the past, consider the future, and move toward a post-modern 
“utopia” that is demilitarized, includes multi-layered democratic 
participation, and reflects a humanization of technology.70  
Unfortunately, in the area of patent law, it appears that we are 
behind the radicalized modernist curve and instead seem caught 
somewhere between pragmatic acceptance and sustained optimism. 
 
 62 Id. at 136. 
 63 See id. 
 64 Id. at 136–37. 
 65 Id. at 137. 
 66 Id. at 136–137. 
 67 Id. at 137. 
 68 Id. at 3, 149–50. 
 69 Id. at 150. 
 70 Id. at 160–164. 
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B. U.S. patent law: a modernist paradigm of “promoting 
progress” that fails to address its societal inadequacies and 
potential harms 
1. Development of the incentive-centered patent paradigm 
Under the Giddens paradigm, a modernist society includes both 
capitalism and industrialism as two of its four basic dimensions.71  
By the time the United States won its independence, European 
culture was steeped in modernism, which extols the virtues of 
capitalism, industrial growth, global expansion and the 
development of military power.72  Since the United States was the 
progeny of England, it is no surprise that we would adopt the 
“modernist” view of progress as the development of a strong 
capitalist framework, sustained industrial and economic growth,73  
and military power.74 
During its infancy stages, the United States was primarily an 
agrarian economy without a true industrial base.75  The Framers, as 
enlightened modernists,76 drafted the Intellectual Property Clause 
of the Constitution to empower Congress to “promote progress” by 
providing federal intellectual property rights that would incentivize 
artistic endeavors, as well as research and development of the 
 
 71 Id. at 59 (outlining the four dimensions of a modern society as: “1) capitalism 
(capital accumulation in the context of competitive labour and product markets); 2) 
industrialism (transformation of nature: development of the ‘created environment’); 3) 
surveillance (control of information and social supervision); and 4) military power 
(control of the means of violence in the context of the industrialization of war)”). 
 72 Id. at 55–62. 
 73 Id. at 58–60. 
 74 See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text; see also GIDDENS, supra note 14, at 
55–62 (discussing the dimension of modernity); ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO 
POSTMODERNISM viii–x (Stuart Sim ed., 3rd ed. 2011) (discussing what constitutes 
“postmodernism.”). 
 75 See Walterscheid, supra note 11, at 15.  
 76 See Walterscheid, supra note 11, at 10, 14; Pollack, supra note 18, at 775–76; see 
also Chon, supra note 19, at 122 (“The essential characteristics of Enlightenment as faith 
continue to dominate legal as well as other forms of discourse.  Enlightenment 
perspectives which are still very much with us today include the privileging of 
individual-centered reasoning as a primary means of apprehending the world, the 
emphasis on empiricism or positivism as required characteristics of any intellectual 
project of integrity, and the continual insistence . . . that critical thinking (a more 
‘progressive’ way of thinking) will point the way to transformative action.”). 
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useful arts.77  This in turn would stimulate industrial development 
and economic growth in the United States, thereby lessening our 
cultural and economic dependency on Europe.78  With this in mind, 
Congress developed a framework of federal patent and copyright 
law which provided exclusive rights for limited times, in exchange 
for adding this wealth of Science (copyrightable subject matter) 
and the useful arts (patentable subject matter) to our ever-
expanding knowledge base.79 
Over time, in both copyright and patent cases, courts reinforced 
the modernist view that providing the incentive to innovate is 
directly related not only to increasing our knowledge base, but also 
to industrial and economic growth.80  For example, in Kewanee  v. 
Bicron,81 a case evaluating whether state trade secret protection is 
preempted by federal patent law, the Court explains how patents 
promote progress “through the introduction of new products and 
processes of manufacture into the economy,” thereby increasing 
employment and making better lives for our citizens.82  Similarly, 
 
 77 See Walterscheid, supra note 11, at 1. 
 78 See Chon, supra note 19, at 120 (discussing how eighteenth-century Americans 
were aware and bothered by their socioeconomic and cultural dependence on Europe.  
Since the U.S. was a “net importer of ideas and technology,” the concept promoting 
progress in the useful Arts and Science (knowledge) would elevate the United States 
from a lesser-developed country to one of “improved global socioeconomic status.”); see 
also Oliar, supra note 3, at 1810 (citing textual support for the literal meaning of the 
Progress Clause as “improvement of knowledge” and “advancement of human 
happiness.”); Fromer, supra note 9, at 1373 (“‘To promote progress of Science and useful 
Arts’ generally refers to the goal of encouraging the advancement of systematic 
knowledge, cultural knowledge, and technology.”). 
Other scholars suggest that rather than having an Enlightenment theory of progress as a 
global proxy for “all is getting better,” the Framers as Federalists would view “Progress” 
as “a qualitative improvement of arts and science” by the spreading or dissemination of 
an increased number of writings or the useful arts.  Under this theory, Congress can only 
grant limited exclusive rights to individuals when “those rights promote the spread of 
science and the useful arts.” See Pollack, supra note 18, at 773–79.  Like Chon, Pollack 
ultimately advocates a post-modern, ever-evolving definition of progress when making 
this evaluation. Pollack, supra note 18, at 778–79. 
 79 See generally Pollack, supra note 18. 
 80 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974). 
 81 Id.   
 82 Id. at 480; see also Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 535 (1966) (“But a patent is 
not a hunting license.  It is not a reward for the search, but compensation for its 
successful conclusion.  ‘(A) patent system must be related to the world of commerce 
rather than to the realm of philosophy.’”). 
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in Eldred v. Ashcroft,83 a copyright case, the Supreme Court cites 
its own precedent to opine that “[t]he economic philosophy behind 
the [IP] Clause . . . is the conviction that encouragement of 
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public 
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors.”84 
Nevertheless, the Framers were concerned about more than the 
modernist dimensions of capitalism and industrial growth when 
drafting the IP clause.  Of equal importance was the fear that an 
overly broad exclusive rights scheme for patents and copyrights 
could have an anti-competitive effect and lead to some of the same 
problems faced by England under the Statute of Monopolies.85  
James Madison and Charles Pinckney86 seemed more driven by the 
need for a uniform federal scheme for patents and copyright as a 
limited monopoly that would benefit the public.87  Although there 
is virtually no legislative history surrounding the IP clause itself, 
some scholars view the IP clause as a compromise which included 
the first limitation “promoting progress” by incentivizing invention 
and writings to promote economic growth and increase knowledge, 
and the second limitation that any exclusive-rights granted to 
authors and inventors must be for “limited times” in order to create 
and preserve a robust public domain.88  Thus, one could infer that 
the “granting of exclusive rights” portion of the IP clause reflects 
the Framers’ modernist goal of incentivizing industrial and 
economic growth within a capitalist framework.89  In sharp 
 
 83 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 84 Id. at 214 (citing Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219,(1954)). 
 85 See Chon, supra note 19, at 139–41.  Because many Framers feared the anti-
competitive effects of monopolies, the IP clause also provided that these exclusive rights 
be provided for “limited times,” thereby ensuring the ultimate enrichment of the public 
domain; see also Oliar, supra note 3, at 1803 (“Despite the anti-monopolistic sentiment—
however widely it was shared—a majority of the Framers probably saw intellectual 
property rights as ‘justified monopolies.’”); Walterscheid, supra note 11, at 37 (“[I]t is 
precisely because the delegates were familiar with the Statue of Monopolies either on 
legal or political terms that they were not about to give Congress any general power to 
create monopolies.”). 
 86 Charles Pinckney is credited as being the drafter of the Constitution’s IP clause. 
Walterscheid, supra note 11, at 25. 
 87 Id. at 24, 48. 
 88 See Fromer, supra note 9, at 1331–32.  
 89 See Walterscheid, supra note 11, at 36. 
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contrast, the “to promote progress” and “limited times” portions 
reflect a broader definition of progress that goes beyond a simple 
balancing of incentives with monopolies and is geared toward 
developing a robust public domain and ensuring adequate access to 
knowledge.90 
While the Copyright Act includes limitations such as fair use91 
that reflect balancing public access against incentive,92 the Patent 
Act remains focused on the incentive-centered narrative.93  It 
contains virtually no limitations reflecting concerns for public 
access, and it only addresses preserving the public domain through 
the twenty year term limitation and basic patentability 
requirements of subject matter, utility, novelty, non-obviousness 
and written description and enablement.94  This lack of statutory 
balance is due in part to the failure of courts to fully explore the 
public access and sustainability aspects of “promoting progress” 
when evaluating patentability.95 
 The 1829 case of Pennock  v. Dialogue is one of the earliest 
patent cases referencing the IP clause’s main objective of 
 
 90 See Chon, supra note 19, at 98–99; Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 
Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1292 (2012). 
 91 See Fair Use, 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West 2012). 
 92 See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The Copyright 
Act was intended to promote creativity, thereby benefitting the artist and the public alike.  
To preserve the potential future use of artistic works for purposes of teaching, research, 
criticism, and news reporting, Congress created the fair use exception.”); Stewart v. 
Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990) (noting that “although dissemination of creative works 
is a goal of the Copyright Act, the Act creates a balance between the artist’s right to 
control the work during the term of the copyright protection and the public’s need for 
access to creative works”); Eng’g Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 
1335, 1344–45 (5th Cir. 1994) (explaining that the limitations on copyright protection 
“follow[] logically from the purpose of the Copyright Act: to protect an author’s original, 
creative expression insofar as is compatible with general advancement of expressive arts 
and ‘the free use and development of non-protectable ideas and processes’”), opinion 
supplemented on denial of reh’g , 46 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 1995). See generally Computer 
Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 93 Matthew W. Coryell, Note, Patent Law as an Incentive to Innovate Not Donate: The 
Role of the U.S. Patent System in Regulating Ownership of Human Tissue, 36 J. CORP. L. 
449, 451 (2011). 
 94 See generally 35 U.S.C.A. § 102 (West 2002); 35 U.S.C.A. § 103 (West 2012); 35 
U.S.C.A. § 112 (West 2012). 
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promoting the progress of Science and the useful Arts.96  
Unfortunately, the Court merely mentioned this limitation in the 
context of focusing on Congress’s ability to merely grant patent 
rights for “limited times.”97  It was not until the 1966 case of 
Graham v. John Deere98 that the Supreme Court articulated the 
constitutional command that the patent system must promote 
progress of the useful Arts.  The Graham Court further emphasizes 
that this standard may not be ignored.99 
Kewanee v. Bicron100 is one of the few patent cases decided 
after Graham that specifically references the Constitution’s IP 
clause then goes on to explain how patent laws promote progress 
by incentivizing inventors to invest in developing patentable 
subject matter, which in turn has a “positive effect on society 
through the introduction of new products and processes of 
manufacture into the economy, and the emanations by way of 
increased employment and better lives for our citizens.”101  Unlike 
Graham, the Kewanee Court failed to discuss whether the progress 
clause does in fact limit Congress’s intellectual property power.102 
Despite the existence of relatively straightforward precedent 
like Graham and Kewanee, later courts were more likely to forego 
any constitutional vetting of their application of the Patent Act 
when evaluating patentability, and some would go so far as to 
ignore the Graham mandate altogether and hold that the progress 
clause was not a limitation on Congress’s intellectual property 
power.103  Rather than engage in a constitutional discourse when 
evaluating patentability, courts were more likely to espouse the 
 
 96 Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 19 (1829). 
 97 Id. at 17. “[T]his could be done best, by giving the public at large a right to make, 
construct, use, and vend the thing invented, at as early a period as possible, having a due 
regard to the rights of the inventor.” Id. at 19. 
 98 See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966) 
 99 Id. at 6. 
 100 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974). 
 101  Id. at 480. 
 102 See generally id. 
 103 See, e.g., Oliar, supra note 3, at 1781–82 (citing a series of cases including 
Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co. of Minn., 770 F.2d 128, 130 (8th Cir. 
1985), Ladd v. Law & Tech. Press, 762 F.2d 809, 812 (9th Cir. 1985), Eldred v. Reno, 
239 F.3d 372, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2001), Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 111–12 (D.C. Cir. 
1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 948 (1982)). 
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“grand incentive narrative” that we must broadly evaluate the 
patent right since patents are essential to incentivizing research and 
development (“R&D”) and that without them we would impede 
economic growth.104  The goal of incentivizing R&D is then 
imbued with as much value as the promotion of the progress of the 
useful Arts.  As a result, with respect to new technologies, courts 
and the PTO continued to broaden what constitutes patent eligible 
subject matter under Section 101 to include “everything under the 
sun as long as it is made by man” that is useful, novel, non-obvious 
and meets the written description and enablement requirements.105  
This paradigm requires elevating Sections 102, 103 and 112 to 
proxies for vetting eligible subject matter under Section 101.106  
This was recently done by the Federal Circuit in CLS Bank 
International. v. Alice.107  There, rather than making Section 101 
 
 104 See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 480–81 (“The patent laws promote this 
progress [from the IP clause mandate] by offering a right of exclusion for a limited period 
as an incentive to inventors to risk the often enormous costs in terms of time, research, 
and development.  The productive effort thereby fostered will have a positive effect on 
society through the introduction of new products and processes of manufacture into the 
economy, and the emanations by way of increased employment and better lives for our 
citizens.”); see also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980) (“The subject-
matter provisions of the patent law have been cast in broad terms to fulfill the 
constitutional and statutory goal of promoting ‘the Progress of Science and the useful 
Arts’ with all that means for the social and economic benefits envisioned by Jefferson.”); 
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 653 F.3d 1329, 1358–81 (2011) (Moore, J., 
concurring) (arguing that patent protection for genomic material, including isolated genes 
is crucial for continued innovation and economic growth of the biotechnology industry). 
 For a scholarly commentary lamenting the current imbalance that results from the 
incentive-based grand narrative see Oppenheimer, supra note 2, at 305 (“[Under the 
mandate of the IP Clause] . . . there is room to reward innovators with exclusive rights 
while still reserving to the public sufficient rights to guard against stifling further 
innovation.  In recent attempts to strike the balance, Congress has tended to focus on the 
motivation to innovate [incentive] side of the balance and paid less attention to the 
impediment to innovation side, perhaps because innovators include well-funded 
lobbyists.”). 
 105 See, e.g., In re Alappat, 33 F. 3d 1526, 1545 (1994); see also supra note 28 and 
accompanying text. 
 106 Since 1984, the PTO rules have allowed the patentability of genetic material, 
including isolated genes, without citing textual support for this interpretation.  Later, the 
Federal Circuit argued that to not view isolated genes as patentable subject matter would 
hurt the biotechnology industry’s 25-year reliance on this unsupported rule. See Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1358–81 (Moore, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part); see also supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 107 CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 685 F.3d 1341 (2012).  
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subject-matter eligibility the threshold test for patentability, the 
court reduced Section 101 to “a general statement of the type of 
subject matter that is eligible for patent protection ‘subject to the 
conditions and requirements of this title.’  Specific conditions for 
patentability follow” in Sections 102, 103 and 112.108  According 
to many courts, by broadly evaluating what constitutes patentable 
subject matter, we ensure “progress of the useful arts,” which, as 
we have seen, is frequently equated with industrial growth.109 
2. The problem with the incentive–centered patent narrative 
Arguably, the incentive-centered view of patents and 
copyrights as engines for stimulating economic progress did in fact 
contribute to the modernist goals of developing a strong capitalist 
framework and stimulating industrial and technological growth.110  
By the twentieth century, the United States was a leader in 
technological development and one of the world’s military and 
economic superpowers.111  Also, the globalization of technology 
motivated the United States, and its fellow members of the Paris 
and Berne Conventions, to advocate for a global intellectual 
property treaty.112  In 1994, the Agreement on Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) was enacted.113  
Article 27.1 of TRIPS requires member states to provide uniform 
patent rights across technologies.114  Having uniform patent 
 
 108 Id. at 1348. 
 109 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980). 
 110 See Walterscheid, supra note 11. 
 111 Robert Kagan, Power and Weakness: Why the United States and Europe see the 
world differently, POL’Y REV. at 5–6, (June-July 2002) 
http://msuweb.montclair.edu/~lebelp/RKaganPowerAndWeakness2002.pdf (explaining 
that after the Cold War, “America’s military power and particularly its ability to project 
that power to all corners of the globe remained unprecedented”). 
 112 SUSAN K. SELL, THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 164 
(2003).  
 113 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, in 
The Legal Texts; The Results Of The Uruguay Round Of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
320 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (1994).  As part of the TRIPS agreement, the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) was established to enforce international trade agreements and 
TRIPS. SUSAN K. SELL, THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 9 
(2003). 
 114 TRIPS at art. 5. 
C02_ROSE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/2013  3:42 PM 
2013] A POSTMODERN VISION OF “PROGRESS”? 1221 
protection among member states creates a global disincentive to 
infringe patented products that were placed into the global stream 
of commerce.115 
What we often neglect to explore in patent law, however, are 
the societal perils and risks wrought by the modernist incentive-
centered paradigm.  Arguably, the over-patenting of basic 
technology creates the risk that downstream research and 
development will be impeded.116  The failure to “humanize” 
technology results in a patent system entrenched in a capitalist 
framework where incentivizing equals industrial/economic growth 
and individuals can be priced out of access to patented 
products/processes, such as pharmaceuticals and genetic testing.117  
Also, since the patent narrative is devoid of any meaningful 
evaluation of potential environmental harms and sustainability 
concerns, we are currently facing these risks both globally and in 
the United States.118 
 
 115 See Todd Rowe, Global Technology Protection: Moving Past the Treaty, 4 MARQ. 
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 107, 138 (2000) (explaining that the development of international 
intellectual property treaties is largely the work of American negotiators working with 
foreign negotiators in the hopes of crafting treaties which all members of the treaties can 
abide by in order to discourage patent infringement on a global scale); see also Marshall 
J. Welch, International Protection of Intellectual Property, 1 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 41, 
50 (1992) (discussing the United States’ attempts to compel nations involved in piracy to 
treat intellectual property owners fairly). 
 116 See Supplemental Brief for Appellees, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 
689 F.3d 1303 (2012) (No. 2010-1406) 2012 WL 2215682 at *10–11 (explaining that 
over patenting may impeded follow up and basic research); see also SECRETARY’S 
ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH, AND SOC’Y, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVICES, GENE PATENTS AND LICENSING PRACTICES AND THEIR IMPACT ON PATIENT 
ACCESS TO GENETIC TESTING (2010) at 53–54 available at 
http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/SACGHS/reports/SACGHS_patents_report_2010.pdf; Heidi L. 
Williams, Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation: Evidence from the Human 
Genome 27 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16213, 2010) (noting 
that patenting genes had “persistent negative effects on subsequent scientific research”). 
 117 See GIDDENS, supra note 14, at 164 (advocating for a move beyond modern 
capitalism and identifying humanization of technology as one of four elements of a post-
modern society). 
 118 See, e.g., Shawn J. Kolitch, The Proper Scope of Patentability in International Law, 
11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. 149, 163–65 (2007) (noting that U.S. patent law requires patents 
to be granted without consideration of possible and often well recognized environmental 
harms); Sarah Tran, Expediting Innovation, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 123, 137 
(advocating for expedited review of patents regarding socially (particularly 
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Applying the Giddens framework, the best response to 
addressing these “perils of  modernism” is for Congress and the 
courts to radically engage in a constitutional and public-policy 
discourse on  how to structure and interpret patent law in a way 
that best meets the constitutional mandate of promoting a balanced 
concept of progress.  Unfortunately, courts and Congress seem to 
be trapped between the “status quo” constructs of pragmatic 
acceptance and sustained optimism.  In some instances, courts 
applying sustained optimism use the incentive-centered narrative 
to persuade us that the modernist paradigm is working and the 
incentive-centered narrative is in fact minimizing risks (by 
adequately balancing incentive and preserving access) and 
maintaining a state of forward-moving progress.119  Other times, 
courts and Congress appear to operate in a state of pragmatic 
acceptance where they feel forced to accept the status quo resulting 
from the incentive-centered narrative and applaud temporary steps 
forward, such as enacting Section 27 of the America Invents Act, 
requiring the PTO to study the effect of exclusive licenses on 
genetic diagnostic testing activity.120  This cycle of pragmatic 
acceptance and sustained optimism is reflected in the Supreme 
Court and Federal Circuit’s evaluation of Section 101 subject-
matter eligibility for areas of new technologies, such as computer-
implemented business methods121 and biotechnology.122 
 
environmentally) beneficial technologies to address sustainability concerns such as 
climate change). 
 119 157 CONG. REC. H4420-06 (daily ed. June 22, 2011) (statement of Rep. Wasserman 
Schultz) 2011 WL 2472415 (proposing that the AIA included a limitation allowing for 
use of patented material for genetic testing).  Unfortunately this proposal was later 
withdrawn and replaced with a requirement that the USPTO conduct a study on the 
impact of exclusive licenses for genetic material on the public. 
 120 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 27(a), 125 Stat. 284, 
338 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.) 
 121 See generally Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010); CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice 
Corp. Pty. Ltd., 685 F.3d 1341 (2012); Peter S. Menell, Forty Years of Wondering in the 
Wilderness and no Closer to the Promised Land: Bilski’s Superficial Textualism and the 
Missed Opportunity to Return Patent Law to its Technology Mooring, 63 STAN. L. REV. 
1289, 1307 (2011). 
 122 See Menell, supra note 121, at 1307; Allen K. Yu, Within Subject Matter 
Eligibility—A Disease and a Cure, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 387, 408–11 (2011). 
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II. SECTION 101 SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY AND NEW 
TECHNOLOGIES: THE INCENTIVE-CENTERED NARRATIVE OF 
MODERNISM DISRUPTS THE BOUNDARIES OF PATENTABILITY 
 
[T]he lack of a clear roadmap for determining the 
boundaries of patentability, the Supreme Court’s 
reluctance to weigh in on these questions in a timely 
manner, the Federal Circuit’s inclination toward 
expansive patentable subject matter, the 
incoherence and vagueness of the Supreme Court’s 
opinions, and the constitutional and political 
impediments to legislative action on patent reform 
have inclined the system reflexively toward 
expansive patentable subject matter whether or not 
it comports with good policy or constitutional, 
jurisprudential, and statutory limits. 
. . . [This] reflects the confluence of two 
powerful independent forces.  The opening of vast 
new technological fields—as has occurred in digital 
technology and biotechnology—presents 
unprecedented challenges to jurists . . . .123 
 
A. Introduction 
Despite the fact that we are now on our third variation of the 
federal patent statute,124 the text outlining what constitutes patent-
eligible subject matter remains the same.  In both the 1952 Patent 
Act and America Invents Acts (“AIA”),125 Section 101 provides: 
Whoever discovers any new and useful, process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or 
any new and useful improvement thereof, may 
 
 123 See Menell, supra note 121, at 1307. 
 124 See Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified as amended 
at 35 U.S.C. § 1 et. seq. (2000)); Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 
§ 27(a), 125 Stat. 284, 338 (2011). 
 125 Note that original patent act contained virtually the same language, but with minor 
differences. 
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obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions 
and requirements of this title.126 
Ironically, unlike the Copyright Act which specifically outlines 
excluded subject matter,127 each iteration of the Patent Act fails to 
address its exclusions.  Instead, we must rely on common law for 
guidance as to what constitutes patent-ineligible subject matter.  
While the law is clear that the three main categories of excluded 
subject matter are laws of nature, scientific principles, and abstract 
ideas,128 there is little consistency on what guidelines courts should 
apply when determining if an invention falls within one of these 
three classes of patent-ineligible subject matter.  What further 
complicated matters is that true to our modernist roots, developers 
of new technologies often assumed that a robust patent portfolio 
was crucial for effectively competing in industry, attracting 
investors and economic growth.129  As noted by Peter Menell, “[a]s 
these investments [in patents] increased, industry players had more 
 
 126 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
 127 See 1976 Copyright Act, Pub. L. 94-553, § 102(b), 90 Stat. 2541–98 (1976) 
(codified as 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(b) (2010) (West)).  Section 102(b) states that “[i]n no case 
does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, 
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, 
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such 
work.”  
 128 See LeRoy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852) (cited by numerous cases, including 
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant, 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (“For patents cannot 
issue for the discovery of the phenomenon of nature.”); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 
U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978)); Gottschalk v. 
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). 
 129 See Menell, supra note 121, at 1305; see also ERNST & YOUNG , BEYOND BORDERS  
GLOBAL BIOTECHNOLOGY REPORT 30 (2011) (noting that the biotech industry experienced 
upper double-digit growth for the second half); see also id. (noting that smaller biotech 
companies continued to grow at close to high double-digit rates for the last half). See 
ERNST & YOUNG, Despite Renewed Growth in 2010, Biotech Industry Faces R&D 
Challenges (June 14, 20111), http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Newsroom/News-
RELEASES/Beyond-borders_global-biotechnology-report-2011; see also Rob Waters, 
Boom Times for Genomics Startups, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 17, 2011). See 
Justin Kuepper, Regenerative Medicine Starts to Attract Attention from Investors, 
BIOTECH STOCK TRADER (July 26, 2011), http://biotechstocktrader.com/regenerative-
medicine-starts-to-attract-attention-from-investors-266/ (providing cited statistics and 
noting that “regenerative medicine will cause a paradigm shift in drug discovery and 
medicine”). 
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to lose from court decisions erasing those investments, even if the 
industry’s trajectory was brighter without patents.”130 
Without clear guidance from the Supreme Court as to the 
subject-matter boundaries, the incentive-centered paradigm of 
“more patents, more innovation” and economic growth131 led to a 
patent-centric view, with patent lawyers leading the charge for 
corporate, industry and trade-policy groups.132  Since modernism 
centers on capitalism and industrial growth, one must agree with 
Menell that the patent-centric view was destined to and indeed 
ultimately permeated “the executive, legislative and judicial 
arenas.”133  For courts, this resulted in an unprecedented expansion 
of the boundaries of subject matter for emerging technologies such 
as software, computer-implemented business methods and 
biotechnology.  Not surprisingly, the Federal Circuit was often the 
pro-patentee court that expanded the subject-matter boundaries 
with sustained optimism.134  Until recently, the Supreme Court’s 
 
 130 See Menell, supra note 121, at 1305. 
 131 Menell describes this modernist platform as “more patents equal more innovation.” 
Id.  He also argues that “public choice theory and empirical evidence suggest that the 
Federal Circuit, as a court specializing in patent adjudication would be pro-patentee and 
inclined toward expanding the scope of patentable subject matter.” Id.  The recent line of 
biotechnology cases decided by the Federal Circuit, such as Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology and Mayo, as well as the latest computer implemented business method case 
CLS Bank Int’l, seem to support the pro-patent view of the Federal Circuit when deciding 
subject matter eligibility cases; see also Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, 
Patenting Science: Protecting the Domain of Accessible Knowledge, in THE FUTURE OF 
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN INFORMATION LAW 192, 193 (Lucie 
Guibault & P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006) (expressing the view that the continued 
patenting of upstream bioproducts, which are more like scientific principles than 
inventions, is a prime example of the Federal Circuit’s patent dominated view on 
innovation”). 
 132 See Menell, supra note 121, at 1305 
 133 Id. at 1306 (citing and quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 217 (1981) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that in Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), 
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 594, 598 (1978), and Diehr, “‘the spokesmen for the organized 
patent bar have uniformly favored patentability and industry representatives have taken 
positions properly motivated by their economic self-interests,’ and that ‘[n]ot 
withstanding fervent argument that patent protection is essential for the growth of the 
software industry, commentators have noted that this industry is growing by leaps and 
bounds without it’”). 
 134 See also Menell, supra note 121, at 1305 (arguing that “public choice theory and 
empirical evidence suggest that the Federal Circuit, as a court specializing in patent 
adjudication, would be pro-patentee and inclined toward expanding the scope of 
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response on appeal was one of pragmatic acceptance of the Federal 
Circuit’s modernist views.135  A review of some key subject matter 
eligibility cases in the rapidly expanding biotechnology and 
genomics areas will shed some light on this trend.136 
B. The PTO and the courts expand the boundaries of subject 
matter eligibility to broaden the patentability of biotechnology 
and genomic subject matter137 
In Funk Brothers v. Kalo,138 the Supreme Court held that a 
novel mixture of several naturally-occurring species of bacteria 
remained an unpatentable “work of nature.”139  Although the 
 
patentable subject matter”). Id. at 1306–07.  The recent line of biotechnology cases 
decided by the Federal Circuit, such as Ass’n for Molecular Pathology and Mayo, as well 
as the latest computer implemented business method case CLS Bank Int’l, seem to 
support the pro-patent view of the Federal Circuit when deciding subject matter eligibility 
cases. 
 135 See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124 (2006) 
(Supreme Court majority declines to hear appeal). But see id. at 126–27(Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 136 I will not discuss the software cases since numerous scholars have discussed the 
trilogy of Gottschalk, Parker, and Diehr, as illustrative of the Supreme Court’s trajectory 
towards broadening what constitutes patentable subject matter under Section 101 in the 
area of software.  Initially, in Gottschalk, the court found the binary-conversion software 
to be a patent-ineligible algorithm. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72 (1972).  Here, 
the court cites the necessity of keeping mathematical formulas in the public domain as a 
basis for drawing its boundaries. Id. at 71–72.  Later in Parker, the court utilizes the same 
principle to hold that software which calculated updated alarm limits was patent-
ineligible since it was no more than an integration of the algorithm into a formula could 
not elevate it to patent-eligible subject matter. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 594, 598 (1978).  
Yet, four years later, a sharply divided court broadened the boundaries of subject-matter 
eligibility by distinguishing  that if the process utilizing the algorithm/program results in 
physical and chemical transformation-it falls within Section 101 patent-eligible subject 
matter. See Menell, supra note 121, at 18; Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Problem with 
Intellectual Property Rights: Subject Matter Expansion, 13 YALE J.L. & TECH. 36, 76–80 
(2011). 
 137 Other scholars have outlined the broadening of patentable subject matter in the 
computer implemented business method cases such as State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998) abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 
F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) and the confusion and inconsistency in analyzing subject-
matter eligibility cases such as Bilski. See generally Lemley, Risch, Sichelman & 
Wagner, Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315 (2011); see also Menell,, supra note 
121. 
 138 Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948). 
 139 See id. at 131 (1948). 
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patentee had manipulated and mixed several species of non-
inhibitive root-nodule bacteria, the Court reasoned that the end 
product was a patent-ineligible product of nature because the 
human intervention did not result in a product biologically 
different from its naturally-occurring counterparts.140  In 1984, the 
Supreme Court was faced with a new dilemma in Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty.  There, the patented product was bacterium that had 
been genetically altered to break down crude oil material.141  Since 
Funk was controlling precedent, the Court had to compare the 
Funk and Chakrabarty inventions to determine if Chakrabarty’s 
was distinguishable as patentable subject matter.142 
The Chakrabarty Court begins the discussion by placing the IP 
Clause’s progress mandate in the modernist context of equating 
progress with socioeconomic growth.143  More specifically, it cites 
Kewanee144 for establishing that the “exclusive rights for limited 
times” provided by patent law promotes progress and has a 
positive effect on society by increasing the number of products 
entering into the economy and also increasing employment, 
thereby improving our overall quality of life.145  Later, when 
addressing the petitioner’s argument that the policy-balancing 
necessary to determine whether genetically engineered organisms 
are patentable is best left to Congress, the Court again focuses on 
incentive-centered progress by opining that Section 101 is “cast in 
broad terms to fulfill the constitutional and statutory goal of 
promoting ‘the Progress of Science and the useful Arts’ with all 
that means for the social and economic benefits envisioned by 
Jefferson.”146 
 
 140 Id. (“The bacteria perform in their natural way.  Their use in combination does not 
improve in any way their natural functioning.  They serve the ends nature originally 
provided and act quite independently of any effort of the patentee.”). 
 141 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980). 
 142 Id. at 310. 
 143 Id. at 307. 
 144 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974). 
 145 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 307 (quoting Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 480 (“The authority of 
Congress is exercised in the hope that ‘[t]he productive effort thereby fostered will have a 
positive effect on society through the introduction of new products and processes of 
manufacture into the economy, and the emanations by way of increased employment and 
better lives for our citizens.’”)). 
 146 Id. at 315. 
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Nevertheless, the Chakrabarty court reached the right result in 
holding that the genetically engineered bacterium qualifies as 
patent-eligible subject matter.  The Court correctly reasoned that 
unlike the mixture in Funk, “the [Chakrabarty] patentee has 
produced a new bacterium with markedly different characteristics 
from any found in nature . . . .  His discovery is not nature’s 
handiwork, but his own; accordingly it is patentable subject matter 
under § 101.”147 
Arguably, because the Chakrabarty Court based its analysis on 
the incentive-driven version of progress, it felt no need to engage 
in equally helpful policy discussions concerning the value of 
Chakrabarty’s bacterium to addressing environmental harms, such 
as crude oil spills.  This would have facilitated a broader vision of 
drawing patentability boundaries and a more balanced vision of 
promoting progress.148  Instead, the Court is probably best known 
for its partial and misleading quote that “Congress intended 
statutory subject matter to include anything under the sun that is 
made by man.”149  While the Federal Circuit has repeatedly used 
this quote to diminish Section 101’s subject matter requirements 
and limitations, the Chakrabarty Court made it clear in its opinion 
that the patentability of “anything under the sun that is made by 
man” language was subject to the exclusions of laws of nature, 
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.150  Unfortunately, the 
Chakrabarty Court’s sustained optimism that later courts and the 
PTO would thoroughly apply Supreme Court precedent and 
carefully evaluate Section 101 as a threshold matter was not to be 
realized. 
 
 147 Id. at 310 (emphasis added).  
 148 Instead, the court gave little weight to the Petitioner’s arguments concerning the 
dangers of patenting genetic research in general and the broader policy issues, such as the 
parade of horribles that might result from the patenting of genetically engineered 
organisms.  The Court was emphatic that it was up to Congress, rather than the Supreme 
Court, to evaluate such policies and determine whether specific limitations should be 
placed in the Patent Act; without this the Court should interpret Section 101. Id. at 316–
17.  
 149 Id. at 309.  As pointed out by many commentators and a few courts, the Committee 
Report quoted went on to include the limitation that anything under the sun made by man 
is subject to Section 101 and the remaining requirements of the Patent Act. See S. REP. 
NO. 82-1979, at 2399 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952).  
 150 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309. 
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For example, in 2001 the PTO used the Chakrabarty 
“everything under the sun made by man is patentable” sentiment, 
without any detailed legal analysis or limitations, to sweepingly 
assert in its Examination Guidelines that isolated genes constitute 
patent-eligible subject matter under Section 101 of the Patent Act 
because “an isolated an purified DNA molecule . . . does not occur 
in that isolated [chemical] form in nature.”151  According to the 
Guidelines, isolated genes are patentable as chemical compounds 
under Section 101, if they meet the other statutory criteria for 
patentability (Sections 102, 103 and 112).152 
The Federal Circuit adopted the PTO Guidelines view of 
isolated genes as “chemical compounds,”153 rather than “biological 
information,” and concluded that the BRCA 1 and BRCA 2 
isolated genes constituted patent-eligible subject matter.154  In 
Association for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (commonly known as the Myriad case),155 Judge 
Lourie, writing for the majority, held that the isolated genes and 
the human-engineered isolated cDNA gene sequences were patent-
eligible subject matter.156  He reasoned that the breaking of 
 
 151 See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093 (Jan. 5, 2001).  In fact, 
since the 1980s the PTO has issued over 2,600 gene patents claiming “isolated DNA” and 
over 40,000 DNA related patents. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 653 F.3d 
1329, 1333 (2011).  In her concurring opinion, Judge Kimberly Moore also cited Federal 
Circuit cases that affirmed the “chemical compound” view of isolated DNA, such as 
Amgen, Inc. v. Chaugai Pharm. Co., which affirmed the validity for a patent claiming “a 
purified and isolated DNA sequence consisting essentially of a DNA sequence encoding 
human erythropoietin.”.Id. at 1344 (quoting Amgen, Inc. v. Chaugai Pharm. Co., 927 
F.2d 1200, 1203–04 (Fed. Cir. 1991), 
 152 See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1096. 
 153 The genes as information view was espoused by the lower court and Judge Bryson 
in his Federal Circuit dissent in part.  For an article discussing the opposing scientific and 
legal scholarly views of genes as information v. chemical compounds, see Allen K. Yu, 
Within Subject Matter Eligibility, a Disease and a Cure, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 387, 410 
(2011). 
 154 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1332 (majority notes that the 
“decision that isolated DNA molecules are patent eligible comports with the longstanding 
practice of the PTO”). 
 155  The case is referred to as the “Myriad” case since the exclusive licensee of the 
patent was Myriad Genetics, who ultimately was the respondent when the petition for 
certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court. 
 156 Id. at 1328.  The Federal Circuit applying Bilski v. Kappos, reversed the lower court 
on the method claims in Myriad, finding that all but one was patentable.   Invalidity was 
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chemical bonds during the isolation process produces genetic 
material that constitutes a “distinct chemical entity” which is 
markedly different from the original product of nature.157  Because 
isolated genes and gene sequences are markedly different from 
their naturally-occurring counterparts (they are smaller and 
chemically-altered), they qualify as patent-eligible subject matter 
under Diamond v. Chakrabarty.158 
 
upheld only for claims directed to comparing or analyzing DNA sequences, because they 
included no transformative steps and covered only ineligible abstract, mental steps. See 
id. at 1334. 
 157 See id. at 1329 (“Thus, when cleaved, an isolated DNA molecule is not a purified 
form of a natural material, but a distinct chemical entity.”). 
 158 More specifically, Judge Lourie opined that “[i]solated DNA has been cleaved (i.e., 
had covalent bonds in its backbone chemically severed) or synthesized to consist of just a 
fraction of the naturally occurring DNA molecule.”  Id. at 1328.  As such, this cleaving 
and synthesizing “[imparts] on that isolated DNA a distinctive chemical identity as 
compared to native DNA.” Id. 
Judge Kimberly Moore’s concurrence further distinguishes that the isolated cDNA falls 
into a separate category since cDNA, although based on a naturally occurring RNA 
template, is totally human engineered and has no naturally occurring counterpart. Id. at 
1340–41 (Moore, J., concurring in part). “The claimed isolated cDNA sequences are the 
creation of man, made using biological tools and the naturally occurring mRNA as a 
template.” Id. at 1341 (Moore, J., concurring in part ). 
For a recent article agreeing with Judges Lourie and Moore but putting a slightly different 
spin on the Chakrabarty rule, see Janice M. Mueller, Facilitating Patient Access to 
Patent-Protected Genetic Testing, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 83 (2011).  In a thought-
provoking piece, Professor Mueller disagrees with the Myriad district court and argues 
that the Chakrabarty rule does not focus on the “marked difference” between the natural 
product and the isolated, purified product, but instead simply requires that the isolated 
product is the subject of human intervention or manipulation. Id. at 88.  I find this 
rationale problematic since the Court used the specific term “marked differences” in its 
holding.  In fact, crucial to the Chakrabarty court’s reasoning was the fact that Dr. 
Chakrabarty’s bacteria could digest crude oil, a feature lacking in its naturally occurring 
counterpart.  This distinction is what aligns Chakrabarty with Funk Brothers.  In Funk 
Brothers, although the patentee manipulated and mixed several species of non-inhibitive 
root-nodule bacteria, the end-product was patent-ineligible subject matter since the 
human intervention did not result in a product that was biologically different from its 
naturally occurring counterpart.  Prof. Mueller argues that there is no need to align 
Chakrabarty and Funk Brothers since Chakrabarty was decided under Section 101’s 
subject matter requirements and Funk Brothers decided on obviousness grounds.  
Although the Funk Brothers court uses the language “lacks inventiveness,” its core 
holding refers to the root-nodule material as “no more than . . . the handiwork of nature 
and hence is not patentable.” Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 
131 (1948).  I would therefore suggest that at best, the Kalo patents were invalidated on 
both subject matter, id. at 131, and obviousness grounds, id. at 442–43.  I posit that it is 
the subject matter rejection that parallels Chakrabarty.  Myriad argues that isolated DNA 
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As part of the Myriad opinion, Judge Lourie conceded that 
biologists may legitimately take the contrary view that since the 
basic isolated BRCA 1/2 genes have the same nucleotide sequence 
as their “native counterparts” (and must have them to carry out the 
invention’s utility of detecting genetic mutations linked to certain 
breast and ovarian cancers), they are not markedly different and 
thus are patent-ineligible products of nature under Section 101.159  
Yet, Judge Lourie maintained the incentive-based argument that 
the court must give great weight to the PTO’s long-standing 
position since 2001 that isolated DNA molecules are patent-
eligible.160  Judge Kimberly Moore, in her concurring opinion, 
agreed with Judge Lourie and reinforced the innovation-focused 
nature of the court’s conclusion.161  She reasoned that 
biotechnology companies have relied on these guidelines to 
develop a significant genomic portfolio and that patent protection 
for genomic material is crucial for continued innovation and 
economic growth of the biotechnology industry.162 
What is conspicuously absent from the Federal Circuit’s 
analysis is any constitutional vetting of which view best promotes 
progress, the “chemical compound” or “biological information” 
patentability analysis.  In April, the Supreme Court remanded the 
Myriad case to the Federal Circuit for reconsideration in light of its 
opinion in Mayo v. Prometheus.163  In Mayo, the Court held that 
access to basic research tools must be considered when evaluating 
Section 101 subject-matter eligibility.  In addition, the Court held 
that Section 101’s bright-line test is applicable to all processes 
involving laws of nature, even when the law of nature is novel.  
 
is “markedly different” because it can be used in diagnostic tests or gene therapy, see 
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1794 
(U.S. Mar. 26, 2012) (No. 11-725), but this property is simply incident to the DNA being 
ex vivo.  The utility of the DNA lies in its naturally-occurring capability to encode 
specific information. 
 159 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1330.  
 160 See id. at 1330–31. 
 161 See id. at 1347. 
 162 Id. 
 163 In Mayo, the court found that the process for correlating thiopurine metabolites with 
dosage effectiveness and related harms from the thiopurine drug constituted patent-
ineligible subject matter. 
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Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit refused to back away from its 
incentive-centered arguments and reaffirmed its opinion that 
isolated BRCA 1/2 genes are patentable subject-matter.164  There is 
only one substantive difference between the first and second 
Federal Circuit opinions.  In the opinion after remand, the Federal 
Circuit was forced to distinguish Myriad from Mayo to avoid being 
bound by this Supreme Court precedent.165  Judge Lourie achieved 
this by arguing that unlike the correlating process in Mayo, 
“permitting patents on isolated genes does not preempt a law of 
nature.”166  He reasoned that isolated genes as compositions of 
matter are more properly viewed as products of man, which often 
follow a law of nature, but are not properly placed in the law of 
nature exclusion evaluated by the Supreme Court in Mayo.167  
Interestingly, Judge Bryson in his dissent draws the more 
reasonable and proper analogy to Mayo: “Just as a patent involving 
a law of nature must have an ‘inventive concept’ that does 
‘significantly more than simply describe . . . natural relations,’ a 
patent involving a product of nature should have an inventive 
concept that involves more than merely incidental changes to the 
naturally occurring product.”168 
Arguably, the Federal Circuit’s artificial distinction of Mayo 
was central to sustaining the incentive-centered narrative.  Indeed, 
Judge Moore, in her concurrence after remand, expressly adopted 
an incentive-focused view of how patents promote progress as part 
of her argument to stay the course and follow the PTO Guidelines 
that isolated genes, such as BRCA 1/2, are patentable.169  She uses 
a quote from the Supreme Court’s earlier Festo opinion when 
stating that: 
The settled expectation of the biotechnology 
industry—not to mention thousands of issued 
patents—cannot be taken lightly and deserve 
 
 164 Id. at 1333. 
 165 Id. at 1331.  
 166 Id.  
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. at 1355 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Mayo 
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294–97 (2012). 
 169 See id. at 1343–47 (Moore, J., concurring). 
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deference.  This outpouring of scientific creativity, 
spurred by the patent system, reflects a substantial 
investment of time and money by the biotechnology 
industry to obtain property rights to DNA 
sequences.  The type of fundamental alteration in 
the scope of patentable subject matter argued in this 
case ‘risk[s] destroying the legitimate expectations 
of inventors in their property.’170 
I suggest that the Federal Circuit’s refusal to give the proper 
deference to the Supreme Court upon remand, and its failure to 
balance the potential harms to progress caused by patenting basic 
research tools such as isolated genes, is a prime illustration of the 
Court’s conservative pragmatic acceptance of the status quo.171  
This course can only be corrected by moving toward a more 
balanced “postmodern” view of progress. 
 
III.  MOVING TOWARD A MORE BALANCED “POSTMODERN” VIEW 
OF PROGRESS 
 
The condition of post-modernity is distinguished by 
an evaporating of the ‘grand narrative’—the 
overarching story-line by means of which we are 
placed in history as beings having a definite past 
and a predictable future.  The post-modern outlook 
sees a plurality of heterogeneous claims to 




 170 Id. at 1344 (quoting Festo Corp. v. Shakes Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Col., 535 U.S. 
722, 739 (2002)). 
 171 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F. 3d at 1348–58 (Bryon, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part); see also Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 131 
(emphasizing access to scientific knowledge as integral to progress); GIDDENS, supra 
note 14, at 134–36 (outlining his theory on “pragmatic acceptance”); Menell, supra note 
121, at 1300–01. 
 172 See GIDDENS, supra note 14, at 2 (1990). 
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Postmodern “Progress,” therefore necessarily 
changes the relatively undifferentiated incentive or 
monopoly framework that characterizes current 
intellectual property [patent] case lawFalse173 An 
idea of progress that rejects sheer material growth 
as its sine qua non changes the focus of our 
intellectual property laws from competition policy 
to the complicated interface between science and 
society.174 
 
A. Intellectual Property and Postmodern Progress 
Despite the frequent assertion that the United States has been a 
“postmodern” society since the 1960’s,175 Giddens counters that 
we are really in the transition mode of “radicalized modernity,” 
where we are questioning the status quo.176  As radicalized 
modernists, we begin to see the weaknesses in each dimension of 
modernity.  We then evaluate our past and current behavior in each 
dimension against current concerns such as humanism, world 
peace and sustainability.  For Giddens, we will not become a true 
postmodern society until we affirmatively deconstruct the current 
modernist dimensions of surveillance and control, industrialism, 
capitalism and military power and replace them with the new 
“contours” or dimensions of: 1) post-scarcity, rather than having a 
“market-based” economy, there is a more equitable distribution of 
wealth and resources (Under this paradigm, quality of life and 
values are no longer centered on status and economic growth and 
ultimately “scarcity” no longer exists for certain economically-
disadvantaged classes or groups.  Giddens concedes that this is 
more easily achieved in the “more affluent areas of the world.”);177 
2) multi-layered democratic participation; 3) demilitarization; and 
 
 173 See Chon, supra note 19, at 125–26. 
 174 Id. at 145 
 175 GIDDENS, supra note 14, at 55–78; see also Sim, ed., supra note 14, at x; Smart, 59 
note 60, at 12. 
 176 GIDDENS, supra note 14, at 149–50. 
 177  Id. at 165–67. 
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4) a humanization of technology.178  To ultimately achieve this 
“utopian” postmodernism, we must continue to radically engage 
and challenge current legal and social constructs in light of the past 
and future in order to determine which changes best effectuate a 
better balance that helps negate the risks and harms created by 
modernism.179 
Margaret Chon, in her seminal article, “Postmodern Progress: 
Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent Power,”180 places this 
discussion in an intellectual property context and advocates 
adopting a “postmodern” view of progress which would allow us 
to evaluate Congress’s copyright and patent power “against a 
complex context of disparities in control over knowledge rather 
than simply against the provision of incentives to inventors.”181  
Like Giddens, Chon describes modern progress as forward-
moving, with an eye toward economic and cultural growth, while 
postmodernism “deconstructs the linear and forward nature of 
‘Progress,’”182 and sometimes limits intellectual property rights if 
limitations necessary to promote a sustainable ecosystem or 
provide access to basic research.183  Without using sociological 
terms such as “radical engagement” and “radicalized modernism,” 
Chon argues that our modern incentive-driven views concerning 
 
 178 Id. at 163–65. 
 179 Id. at 177–78. 
 180 See Chon, supra note 19. 
 181 Id. at 133 (outlining the Framers’ and Americans’ awareness that they were 
economically and culturally behind European nations and therefore believed that 
regulating information and invention would contribute to improvement of America’s 
socioeconomic and cultural status). 
 182 Id. at 101 
 183 Id.; see also id. at 125.  
Yet, importantly, a postmodern “Progress” is not defined simply by 
the eschewal of the grand story line of modern progress. 
“Postmodern” progress is progress that is consistent with the 
“bottom-up” approach of postmodernism, one that recognizes that 
“progress”ive acts may be backward as well as forward, perhaps 
sideways, and most often circular (as exemplified by the accelerated 
reflexivity of knowledge). 
Id. at 125 (quoting PAULINE M. ROSENAU, POST-MODERNISM AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: 
INSIGHTS, INROADS, AND INTRUSIONS 25 (1st ed. 1992); see also Chon, supra note 19, at 
98 n.3 (“We are abroad in a world which is thoroughly constituted through reflexively 
applied knowledge, but where at the same time we can never be sure that any given 
element of that knowledge will not be revised.”); GIDDENS, supra note 14, at 39. 
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intellectual property have prevented courts and Congress from 
taking on the “Progress Project”— stepping back and carefully 
reflecting on whether progress in the constitutional context means 
more than simply incentivizing the production of knowledge to 
achieve economic/industrial growth.184  In other words, did the 
Framers actually have a broader “postmodern” view of progress 
than the current incentive-centered paradigm would suggest, a 
view in which access to knowledge was at least as significant as, 
and possibly more significant than, incentivizing the production of 
knowledge?185 
Chon boldly posits that the constitutionally sound view of 
promoting progress treats the goal of maintaining access to 
knowledge as a more fundamental constitutional mandate than the 
incentivizing of the creation of Science and the useful Arts.186  
This broad and more balanced vision of progress requires courts to 
replace the incentive-centered discussion with one that gives more 
credibility to access issues.  She discusses the computer software 
cases of Computer Associates v. Altai and When Associates v. 
Jaslow Dental Laboratory as illustrative of the Supreme Court’s 
“lack of vision with respect to this larger Progress project.”187 
In establishing why a balanced view of progress is more 
constitutionally sound, Chon notes the Framer’s original vision of 
promoting “[l]ife, [l]iberty, and [t]he [p]ursuit of happiness” as the 
basis of  a  modernist social construct wherein enlightened citizens 
could build a strong  nation-state utilizing the principles of 
democracy, capitalism and industrialism and economic growth.  
Central to this modernist construct was improving our 
socioeconomic and cultural status to be on par with that of 
European nations.188  The constitutional mandate of the IP clause 
 
 184 See Chon, supra note 19, at 117 (arguing that this is the essence of the 18th Century 
Enlightenment Project. “This utopian [modernist] faith in progress produced an optimism 
that knowledge will surely yield good results rather than bad, and improvements rather 
than regressions.”). 
 185 See id. at 134–35. 
 186 See id. at 104 (“[T]extual evidence suggests that the incentives provided by 
copyrights and patent are only second-order concerns which serve a higher purpose—the 
“Progress” project—which preserves and nurtures a commons of knowledge.”). 
 187 Id. at 107–10. 
 188 Id. at 119–21. 
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to develop a regulatory framework for patents and copyrights in 
order to promote “progress in Science and the useful Arts” was 
seen as aiding these modernist goals. 
What courts and many scholars overlook, according to Chon, is 
that the writings of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison reflect 
an equally strong desire that this clause not only incentivize the 
creation of knowledge but preserve a “right of access” to this 
knowledge.189  She carefully walks us through the Federalist 
papers and establishes that although Madison was a vocal advocate 
of a federal intellectual property scheme, he realized that there 
must be a “public good” or “access to knowledge” included within 
this property right.190  Chon points us to Federalist Paper No. 43, 
where Madison states with respect to the patent and copyright 
clause (IP clause) that “the public good fully coincides with the 
claims of individuals.”191  Jefferson was even more adamant than 
Madison about preserving free access to knowledge and went so 
far as to propose an award system for authors and inventors, rather 
than one granting federal intellectual property rights.192  Indeed, in 
a letter to Madison during the drafting of the Constitution, 
Jefferson indicates that he would have left the IP clause out of the 
Constitution.193 
Other commentators join Chon in inferring that Jefferson’s 
agreement to support the IP clause was a compromise premised on 
the clause’s inclusion of the dual limitations of only providing 
rights that “promoted progress” and proving these rights for 
“limited times.”194  Unlike Chon, however, these commentators 
cite the Framer’s views and the ultimate compromise to 
supplement their textual and structural arguments that the Progress 
 
 189 See id. at 104; see also id. at 134–43 (outlining how the works of Jefferson and 
Madison compare). 
 190 See id. at 135–36. 
 191 See id. at 137 (quoting James Madison, Federalist Paper No. 43). 
 192 See id. at 140–44; Chon posits that one might infer from Jefferson’s reluctance, “the 
notion that he valued the freedom to acquire knowledge” as more prominent property 
right than providing a right to exclude. Id. at 143. 
 193 See e.g. Oliar, supra note 3, at 1786, citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James 
Madison (July 31st, 1788), in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 476 (Phillip B. Kurland & 
Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).  
 194 See e.g., Oliar, supra note 3, at 1777. 
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portion of the IP clause expressly limits Congress’s intellectual 
property power.195  Chon takes this premise one step further and 
advocates that “promoting progress” goes beyond incentivizing 
authors and inventors to increase knowledge, and includes the 
fundamental right of each human to access that knowledge.196 
 Placing Chon’s arguments in the Giddens framework, her 
thesis urges courts and Congress to become radicalized modernists 
and challenge whether patent law currently promotes a balanced 
and constitutionally sound view of progress.  To do this, courts 
must replace the incentive-centered narrative, which broadly draws 
patent boundaries since patents per se promote progress, with a 
narrative that considers “access to knowledge” when drawing the 
boundaries surrounding this right.  I posit that in Mayo v. 
Prometheus, the Supreme Court begins to embrace the vision of 
the Progress Project by acknowledging access to basic “building-
block” research as a fundamental right which sometimes 
supersedes the presumptive power of patents to incentivize 
research.197 
B. Mayo Collaborative Servs. Inc.  v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.198: 
The Supreme Court takes a step towards postmodern progress 
by restoring balance to Section 101’s subject-matter eligibility 
requirements 
Justice Breyer, writing for the dissent in the Metabolite case,199 
opined that it was a mistake for the Supreme Court to dismiss its 
earlier writ of certiorari simply because the petitioners failed to 
refer to the Section 101 subject-matter eligibility issue in its lower 
court claims.200  He argued that clarifying the law in this area 
“sooner rather than later” would work to the public’s benefit, 
 
 195 See Fromer, supra note 9, at 1349–50; Oliar, supra note 3, at 1781–84. 
 196 See Chon, supra note 19, at 144. 
 197 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303 (2012) 
(“And so the cases have endorsed a bright-line prohibition against patenting laws of 
nature, mathematical formulas and the like, which serves as a somewhat more easily 
administered proxy for the underlying ‘building-block’ concern.”). 
 198 Id. 
 199 See generally Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124 
(2006).  
 200 Id at 132–33 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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particularly since it was already briefed and argued by the 
parties.201  Like a voice in the wilderness, he ended by 
admonishing the Court that it “could contribute to the important 
ongoing debate, among both specialists and generalists, as to 
whether the patent system, as currently administered and enforced, 
adequately reflects the ‘careful balance’ that ‘the federal patent 
laws . . . embod[y].’”202  Unfortunately, it took several years and 
an appeal after remand before the Court returned to this debate and 
restored balance to Section 101’s subject-matter eligibility 
requirements. 
In Mayo Collaborative Services Inc. v. Prometheus 
Laboratories, Inc.,203 Prometheus Labs patented a process 
measuring the relationship between metabolite levels in the blood 
and the likelihood that a particular dosage of thiopurine204 is either 
effective or harmful.  Mayo Collaborative Services, a licensee of 
the Prometheus patent, eventually developed its own improved 
process for correlating thiopurine metabolite levels with the drug’s 
efficacy.205  Prometheus sued Mayo for patent infringement and 
Mayo counterclaimed that the patent was invalid since it 
constituted patent-ineligible subject matter under Section 101 of 
the Patent Act.206  The District court held that the patent was an 
unpatentable product of nature since the additional steps were well 
known.207  On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the District 
court, holding that the additional steps transformed the product of 
nature into patent-eligible subject matter under the court’s 
 
 201 Id. at 134 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 202 Id. at 138 (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 
146 (1989)). 
 203 See generally Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 
(2012). 
 204 Thiopurine is a drug used to treat a range of intestinal disorders such as Irritable 
Bowel Syndrome (IBS). See id. at 1350. 
 205 Id. at 1290. 
 206 See id. at 1295–97. 
 207 Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs, CIV. 04CV1200JAHRBB, 
2008 WL 878910 at *14 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008) rev’d, 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
cert. granted, judgment vacated, 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010), rev’d, 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 
2010), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
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“machine or transformation” test.208  Mayo then filed its first writ 
of certiorari, which resulted in the Supreme Court remanding the 
case to the Federal Circuit for reconsideration in light of its 
decision in Bilski v. Kappos,209 which limited the machine-or-
transformation test to a clue, rather than the sole test case for 
determining whether a process constitutes Section 101 patent 
eligible subject matter.210  On remand, the Federal Circuit 
reaffirmed its holding by stating that even using the machine-or-
transformation test as a clue-the process claims “do not encompass 
laws of nature or preempt natural correlations”211 and are patent-
eligible, since “they [the claims] transform the human body by 
administering a thiopurine drug and transform the blood by 
analyzing it to determine metabolite levels.”212  Mayo then filed a 
second writ for certiorari which was granted by the Supreme 
Court.213 
Justice Breyer, writing for a unanimous majority, reversed the 
Federal Circuit and held that the process was patent-ineligible 
subject matter since the additional steps fail to “transform[] the 
unpatentable natural laws into patent-eligible applications of those 
laws.”214  I argue that the Supreme Court’s analysis and response 
 
 208 Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010). 
 209 See generally Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).  
 210 Id. at 3226–27. 
 211 Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1355 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
 212   Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1302 
(2012).  The Federal Circuit analogized the Prometheus process to the process in 
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187–88 (1981), where the court held that the process 
(software based) for molding uncured rubber using the Arrhenius equation was patent 
eligible since it included significant post-solution activity in addition to the basic 
mathematical algorithm, thus transforming the algorithm based process into patent 
eligible subject matter. 
 213 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 3027, 180 L. Ed. 2d 
844 (2011). 
 214 Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294.  
Claim 1, for example, states that if the levels of 6-TG in the blood (of 
a patient who has taken a dose of a thiopurine drug) exceed about 400 
pmol per 8x10 red blood cells, then the administered dose is likely to 
produce toxic side effects.  While a human action (the administration 
of the thiopurine drug) to trigger a manifestation of this relation in a 
particular person, the relation itself exists in principle apart from any 
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to counter-arguments demonstrate a radicalized modernist 
approach where the court radically engages the incentive-centered 
paradigm and restores balance to evaluating patentability under 
Section 101. 
The Court begins the Mayo opinion using the traditional tools: 
reciting the plain language of Section 101, then evaluating key 
precedents that establish the common law basis for excluding laws 
of nature, natural phenomena and abstract ideas since they are the 
building blocks for scientific and technological work.215  The Court 
acknowledges that its own precedent cautions against an overly 
broad interpretation of the common law exclusion, since on some 
level, every invention is based on a law of nature, natural 
phenomena or abstract idea.216  For a process centered around a 
law of nature to become patentable, however, it must include 
enough additional steps to create an “‘inventive concept’ sufficient 
to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more 
than a patent upon the natural law itself.”217  Steps that amount to 
no more than insignificant post-solution activity cannot be used to 
circumvent the law of nature exclusion.218 
The law of nature raised in the Prometheus claims was the 
relationship between concentrations of certain metabolites in the 
blood and the likelihood that a particular drug dosage would either 
be ineffective or cause harm.219  The Court breaks into three 
categories the additional steps that went beyond reciting the 
 
human action.  The relation is a consequence of the ways in which 
thiopurine compounds are metabolized by the body—entirely natural 
processes.  And so a patent that simply describes that relation sets 
forth a natural law.  
Id. at 1296–97. 
 215 Id. at 1293–94 (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3233–34 (2010); Diamond 
v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980); Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185; Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 
How. 156, 175, 14 L.Ed. 367 (1853); O’Reily v. Morse, 15 How. 62, 112–120, 14 L.Ed. 
601 (1854); cf. Neilson v. Harford, Webster’s Patent Cases 295, 371 (1841)).  
 216 Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293. 
 217 Id. at 1294 (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 594, 598 (1978)). 
 218  Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294 (citing Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3218). 
 219 See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1296–97 (reciting the law of nature portion of claim 1: “[I]f 
the levels of 6-TG in the blood (of a patient who has taken a dose of a thiopurine drug) 
exceed about 400 pmol per 8x10 red blood cells, then the administered dose is likely to 
produce toxic side effects.”). 
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excluded law of nature: 1) the administering steps, 2) the wherein 
steps and 3) the determining steps.220  The Court outlines the basic 
arguments for why each step as well as the combination fail to 
transform the law of nature into patent-eligible subject matter.  
First, the administering step did no more than identify the relevant 
audience of doctors treating auto-immune diseases, which is well 
known.221  Second, the determining step failed to transform the 
process since instructing doctors or lab technicians to measure the 
thiopurine metabolite level was obvious and already carried out for 
some time in the field before the patent was issued.222  Third, the 
wherein clause did no more than contextualize the relevant natural 
laws and suggest its significance in treating patients.223  Last but 
not least, even the combination of the three additional steps failed 
to transform the Prometheus law of nature since it “add[ed] 
nothing to the laws of nature that is not already present when the 
laws are considered separately.”224 
Justice Breyer then proceeded with a detailed Section 101 
analysis based on the controlling precedents of Diehr and Flook.225  
He artfully switched between the cases to illustrate how the 
patentability of claim 1 of the Prometheus patent is weaker than 
Diehr (where the additional steps of installing rubber in a press, 
closing the mold, constantly determining the molds temperature, 
recalculating the cure time using the law of nature and a digital 
computer were not conventional, obvious or convention, so could 
qualify as significant post-solution activity) and no stronger than 
Flook (where the additional steps failed to transform the 
unpatentable formula for computing an updated alarm limit never 
provided details such as how to select the formula variables and 
discussion of  various chemical processes involved in the catalytic 
conversion of hydrocarbons were all well-known and lacked an 
 
 220 Id. at 1297–98. 
 221 Id. at 1297. 
 222 Id. at 1297. 
 223 Id. at 1297–98 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 594, 590 (1978), for support that 
“purely conventional or obvious pre-solution activity is normally not sufficient to 
transform an unpatentable law of nature into a patent-eligible application of such a law”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 224 Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1291 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981)) 
 225 Id. at 1292, 1298–1300 
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inventive concept).226  He used the British case of Neilson as 
support for the proposition that adding a series of broad 
conventional steps without inventive aspects cannot elevate a law 
of nature into patent-eligible subject matter; and he used  Bilski 
and Benson as support for the view that limiting the process to one 
particular field, such as treating intestinal focused autoimmune 
disorders, is not enough to transform steps relating to a law of 
nature into patent-eligible subject matter.  (Bilski’s claims 
expressly limited use of the hedging formula to the commodities 
and energy markets, and Benson’s binary conversion process was 
limited to the then-new area of digital computers.)227 
The Mayo opinion starts to radically engage the status quo 
when it takes more than one or two sentences to discuss why the 
policy of excluding laws of nature, natural phenomena and abstract 
ideas from qualifying as patent-eligible subject matter must extend 
to newly discovered and innovative laws of nature, such as the 
specific correlations between thiopurine metabolite levels and the 
dosages outlined in the Prometheus patents.  In other words, we 
can no longer begin and end the discussion with the argument that 
patents per se promote progress, so innovative processes must be 
broadly evaluated under Section 101.228  The opinion begins by 
noting that the Supreme Court in Benson, Flook and Bilski 
articulated concerns that the patenting of such processes, no matter 
how novel, would inhibit future innovation both within and outside 
of the particular field.229 
As part of its discussion, the Court conceded that while 
rewarding patents for new processes centered around a law of 
nature might in fact incentivize additional discoveries, there 
remains the problem that society needs access to such laws and 
 
 226 Id. at 1292.  
 227 Id. at 1300–02. 
 228 See generally id. 
 229 Id. at 1301; see also Gottschalk v. Benson, 93 S. Ct. 253, 255 (1972) (noting that the 
claims were “so abstract and sweeping as to cover both known and unknown uses of the 
[mathematical formula]”); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct 3218, 3231 (2010) (pointing out 
that to allow “petitioners to patent risk hedging would pre-empt use of this approach in 
all fields”); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 586 (1978) (expressing concern that the 
claimed process was simply “a formula for computing an updated alarm limit,” which 
might “cover a broad range of potential uses”). 
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principles since they are the “basic tools of scientific and 
technological work.”230  More specifically, the court cautions that 
this danger is particularly acute when the “patented process 
amounts to no more than an instruction to ‘apply a natural law,’ or 
otherwise forecloses more future invention than the underlying 
discovery could reasonably justify.”231  Unwilling to rely on 
judicial precedent alone, the Court then cited numerous scholarly 
articles that support this position and explain, for example, that 
“exclusion from patent law of basic truths reflects ‘both . . .  the 
enormous potential for rent seeking that would be created if 
property rights could be obtained in them and . . . the enormous 
transaction costs that would be imposed on would-be users [of 
those truths].’”232 
The argument remained that the narrow and specific nature of 
the Prometheus claims would limit their ability to significantly 
interfere with future innovation, so even a single step beyond the 
basic law should be enough to cross over into Section 101 
patentable subject matter.233  Justice Breyer countered by pointing 
out that that even narrowly drawn laws of nature can inhibit 
progress, and that courts are ill-equipped to distinguish among 
different laws of nature.234  Thus, the better view is for courts to 
apply the “bright-line prohibition against patenting laws of nature” 
which serves as an adequate and user-friendly proxy for “the 
underlying ‘building-block’ concern[s].”235 
Next, the Court addressed the Government’s arguments that the 
Section 102 (novelty), 103 (nonobviousness) and 112 (written 
description/enablement) requirements perform adequate screening 
 
 230 Mayo, 132 S. Ct at 1301 (citing Benson, 93 S. Ct  at 67).  
 231 Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301 (“One problem with [process] patents is that the more 
abstractly their claims are stated, the more difficult it is to determine precisely what they 
cover.  They risk being applied to a wide range of situations that were not anticipated by 
the patentee.”). Id. at 1302 (quoting C. BOHANNAN & H. HOVENKAMP, CREATION  
WITHOUT RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION, 12 (2012).  See 
generally Lemley, Risch, Sichelman, & Wagner, Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315 
(2011) (arguing that § 101 reflects this kind of concern). 
 232 Mayo, 132 S. Ct., at 1302 (citing W. Landes & R. Posner, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 305–06 (2003)). 
 233 Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1303. 
 234 Id. 
 235 Id. 
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functions for patentability, without the need for a separate Section 
101 subject matter analysis.236  Adopting this view, according to 
Justice Breyer, would “make the ‘law of nature’ exception to 
Section 101 patentability a dead letter.”237 He further reasons 
Sections 102, 103 and 112 each have their own clearly articulated 
screening function, which does not evaluate the “kind of risk that 
underlies the law of nature exception, namely the risk that a patent 
on the law would significantly impede future innovation.”238  Even 
in those instances where there appears to be an overlap between 
the Section 102 novelty and Section 101 patent-eligibility inquiry, 
it is not enough to allow Section 102 to serve as a proxy for 
Section 101 since this would create “significantly greater legal 
uncertainty, while assuming that those sections [102, 103 and 112] 
can do work that they are not equipped to do.”239 
Justice Breyer further noted that nothing in the plain language 
of Sections 102, 103 or 112 supports allowing them to serve as 
proxies for Section 101, and that to allow these requirements to do 
so would “create the kind of risk that underlies the law of nature 
exception, namely the risk that a patent on the law would 
significantly impede future innovation.”240  Justice Breyer 
concluded by expressly holding that “[t]hese considerations lead us 
to decline the Government’s invitation to substitute Sections 102, 
103 and 112 inquiries for the better established inquiry under 
Section 101.”241  This holding demonstrates the Court’s 
willingness to radically engage the status quo, to draw the correct 
 
 236 Id. at 1303–04.  
 237 Id. at 1303. 
 238 Id. at 1304 (stating that “[t]he Government, however, suggests in effect that the 
novelty of a component law of nature may be disregarded when evaluating the novelty of 
the whole. . . .  But §§ 102 and 103 say nothing about treating laws of nature as if they 
were part of the prior art when applying those sections.”).  As to Sections 102 and 103, 
Breyer notes that “studiously ignoring all laws of nature when evaluating a patent 
application under §§ 102 and 103 would ‘make all inventions unpatentable because all 
inventions can be reduced to underlying principles of nature which once known, make 
their implementations obvious.’” Id. at 1304 (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 
189. n.12. (1981)).  
 239 Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1304.   
 240 Id.; see also Risch, Everything is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 591 (2008) 
(defending a minimalist approach to Section 101). 
 241 Id. 
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patentability boundaries and to restore the significance of Section 
101 as the threshold test for patentability.  Furthermore, implied in 
an analysis that takes into account statutory language, incentivizing 
research and access issues is a more balanced view of progress—
one where Section 101’s law of nature exclusion is carefully 
evaluated to ensure access to basic research.242  This reflects one 
giant step toward Chon’s postmodern “Progress Project,” where 
the access right becomes as fundamental to promoting progress as 
incentivizing new and useful natural laws.243 
Further, the Mayo opinion concludes with Justice Breyer 
revisiting the conflicting views concerning whether denying 
patentability will interfere significantly with diagnostic research244 
or prevent the creation of patent thickets so that “critical scientific 
data that must remain widely available” for future discoveries is 
indeed made available.245  He acknowledges that patent law has the 
difficult task of balancing these competing interests across the 
“many different fields of human endeavor.”246  Yet, Justice Breyer 
concludes that it is better to stick with the “established general 
rules” because a special rule to promote innovation for one 
industry may produce “unforeseen results” or problems for 
another.247  Breyer takes the last radicalized modernist or “Progress 
Project” step by recognizing that it is well within Congress’s role 
to create sui generis legislation or “more finely tailored rules where 
necessary” to promote progress.248 
The only instance where Justice Breyer’s virtually flawless 
opinion falls short ]is that he fails to clearly articulate a connection 
between the constitutional limitation “to promote progress” and 
 
 242 Id. at 1305. 
 243 See Chon, supra note 19, at 102–03; see also Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1302–04.   
 244 Id. at 1304–05 (noting that this is the fourth argument raised by Prometheus Labs).  
 245 Id. (citing Brief for American College of Medical Genetics et al. as Amici Curiae 7). 
The counter-argument of denying patentability to prevent patent thickets and promote 
research was made by various Amici Curiae such as the AMA, AHA, AAMC and 
Association for Medical Pathology. Id.  
 246 Id. at 1305.  
 247 Id.  
 248 See id.  Because of this, Breyer ends the opinion by side-stepping the policy 
evaluation of whether sui-generis legislation or “increased protection for discoveries of 
diagnostic laws of nature is desirable.” Id.  
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how the limitation necessitates  the “bright-line” law of nature 
exclusion and restores balance to evaluating the law of nature 
exclusion and Section 101 as the threshold test for patentability.249  
As noted by Menell, “[t]he proper interpretive path for patentable 
subject matter—from constitutional, jurisprudential, and pragmatic 
standpoints—requires courts to integrate the constitutional and 
jurisprudential traditions surrounding patentable subject matter 
with principles of statutory construction and forthright recognition 
of the challenges of applying historic doctrines to unforeseeable 
technological developments.”250  Nevertheless, for the first time, 
the Supreme Court does consider the impact of novel diagnostic 
tools on innovation and access, and also includes both plain 
language and jurisprudential analysis in its patentability evaluation.  
This is a vast improvement over Bilski and many Federal Circuit 
opinions.  Moreover, despite the Court’s failure to specifically 
mention the IP clause and its progress limitation, a more balanced 
view of “promoting progress” is inherent in each of its arguments. 
CONCLUSION 
A radicalized modern view of patent law allows us to challenge 
the incentive-centered narrative of promoting progress and 
consider this narrative’s impact on future discoveries, humanism, 
morality and the environment.  In Mayo v. Prometheus, the 
Supreme Court takes a step in the direction of postmodern progress 
by restoring a balanced view of subject-matter eligibility and 
leaving the door open for Congress to explore other paradigms for 
protecting certain patent-ineligible subject matter. 
 
 
 249 See Peter S. Menell, FORTY YEARS OF WONDERING IN THE WILDERNESS AND NO 
CLOSER TO THE PROMISE LAND: BILSKI’S SUPERFICIAL TEXTUALISM AND THE MISSED 
OPPORTUNITY TO RETURN PATENT LAW TO ITS TECHNOLOGY MOORING, 63 STAN. L. REV. 
1289, 1307–08 (2011) (noting that “[b]y failing to explicate the framework for 
delineating the scope of patentable subject matter or its contours, the Court shirked its 
larger constitutional responsibility, thereby contributing to a pathological political 
dynamic that undermines the patent system”). 
 250 Id. at 1308. 
